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All the world's a stage and all the men and women merely
players .... I
1. INTRODUCTION
The juridical conceptions of statehood and sovereignty are
currently a "hot button" topic in the legal arena for reasons not
difficult to discern.2 The cast of characters vying for roles on the
world stage and the nature of the roles to be played are currently
expanding so rapidly that observers can hardly keep up. As new
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1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT, act 2, sc. 7.
2 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-
First Century: External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM TNT L
.U. 1685 (1995) (redefining the concept of sovereignty in the realm of
international law); Robert Brown & Michael Alexander, Sovereignty in the
Modern Age, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 273 (1994) (pointing out the limits of sovereign-
ty in today's "global village"); Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian
Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127 (1995) (discussing the
implications of sovereignty in international criminal law); Joel P. Trachtman,
Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power and Responsibility, 20
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399 (1994) (examining sovereignty from an international
economic law perspective); Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property
Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 359 (1994) (discussing the issues
of state sovereignty and private property rights in outer space).
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players enter the scene, our notions of the role of the State are
challenged. The rapidity of the changes taking place and the often
ill-defined mechanisms through which they are effected make it
difficult to fully comprehend their effects on the traditional state-
centric model of international law. This difficulty in turn leads
to many seemingly contradictory assertions about the proper
positioning of the State as a player in the international legal order.
One position, which I refer to as the "demise-of-the-State"
camp, rejects the idea that the State can remain the supreme
player in the international arena as non-state participants in that
system move inexorably towards "globalization" or "international-
ization."3 While recognition of the interconnection of States is
by no means new,4 demise-of-the-State proponents take the
argument to the extreme. They argue that recent technological
advances in areas such as communications have linked the fortunes
of States in ways which make or soon will make national borders
insignificant. As the transnational flow of goods and services
gains momentum, States will lose their ability to exercise indepen-
dent control over matters traditionally within their power.
Pointing to the increased use (or at least increased formation)
of non-state organizations to monitor transnational issues such as
trade' and the environment,6 demise theorists claim that a state-
3 See, e.g., KENICI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE
OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 11 (noting that "nation state has become an
unnatural - even a dysfunctional - organizational unit for thinking about
economic activity" and that nation states are no longer "meaningful units of
participation in the global economy of today's borderless world"); Thomas G.
Weiss & Jarat Chopra, Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to Humani-
tarian Space, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA) STATE SovEREIGNTY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL INTERVENTION 87 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995)
[hereinafter BEYOND WESTPHALIA]; see generally Brand, supra note 2.
' See generally Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the
Loss of Economic Power, Daedalus, Spring 1995, at 23 (arguing that globalization
has caused nation-states to lose their sovereignty to regional and global
institutions); see, e.g., RICHARD N. COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDE-
PENDENCE: ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ATLANTIC COMMuNITY (1968)
(analyzing the consequences for economic policy of changes in the structure of
international economic intercourse among industrial countries); ERNST B.
HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (1964) (exploring the relationship between aims of nations and
"a growing mutuil deference and institutional mingling").
I See Vivien A. Schmidt, The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of
Business and the Decline of the Nation-State, Daedalus, Spring 1995, at 75
(acknowledging that nation-states have sacrificed their own independence as




centric model of international governance is outmoded. Instead,
other entities must address many concerns traditionally within the
exclusive purview of States; this severely limits the role to be
played by the State on the world stage. There are abundant
metaphors7 to describe a world where state primacy is no longer
central to the international legal order. Demise-of-the-State
theorists focus their attention on the need for legal structures with
a global reach which recognize and accommodate the changing
shape of this new world.'
In seeming opposition to the demise-of-the-State position, some
theorists believe the State is and will remain the lead actor on the
international stage, a position I refer to as the "primacy-of-the-
State" camp." This position is reinforced by changes in the world
map in the past decade. As long-standing political orders such as
the Soviet bloc crumble, new groups fight for national indepen-
dence and international recognition of their statehood with
varying degrees of success.'"
6 See Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence I. Sperling, The Network of Environmen-
tal Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation in North America and the Western
Hemisphere, 30 INT'L LAW. 111 (1996) (reviewing the policy and legal challenges
to building an international environmental enforcement and compliance
cooperation network).
7 A partial list might include "global village," "space-ship earth," "new
world order," "borderless world," "new international legal order," and "global
system of law." See Brand, supra note 2, at 1696.
. See generally Nagan, supra note 2 (noting the need for a permanent
international criminal tribunal); Schmidt, supra note 5 (discussing the growing
international nature of business markets); see also Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond
National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law ofPersonalJurisdiction
in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373 (1995) (asserting that new
agreements are needed to define the international law of jurisdiction).
9 See, e.g., ALAN S. MiLWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-
STATE 445 j992) (noting that even when European Community member-states
have surrendered sovereignty, "they have produced an arrangement which left
almost all political power with the nation-state"); Schmidt, supra note 5, at 101
("[T]he nation-state will continue to be the prime interlocutor in an increasing-
ly complex world, and the only one that speaks with authority to both
supranational and subnational authorities.").
10 For the most part, the republics of the former Soviet Union have
received international recognition as States. However, for some, great sacrifices
have yet to result in status as "States." See Yeltsin Rejects Chechnya as an
Independent Country, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 1997, at 1997 WL 5532354, at I1
[hereinafter Yeltsin Rejects Chechnya] (reporting that Russian President Boris
Yeltsin recently "ruled out ... any agreement with Chechnya that would
recognize the separatist republic as an independent country"). Another example
is the Kurdish battle for statehood against Iraq. See The Kurdish Dilemma, THE
1997]
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These "demise-of-the-State"and "primacy-of-the-State"positions
seem to directly contradict one another: while one posits the
irrelevance of the State, the other stresses its continued impor-
tance. Closer examination reveals, however, that the two may not
oppose one another so diametrically. As is often the case, each
position reflects some of the reality of today's world. What the
divergent positions highlight is the need to re-examine the
traditional conception of what it means to be a "State." Subsumed
within that analysis is the issue of the traditional perception of
"sovereignty" as it articulates a role for the State in the interna-
tional system.
This re-examination of sovereignty has begun in earnest in
some places." Many of the changes mentioned above, including
the emergence of new States and new state groupings, are readily
apparent to most observers and are being considered in the
ongoing discussion of sovereignty. Other changes, however, are
less obvious, and yet may have as important, if not more
important, ramifications for a state-centric international legal
model. Rapid advances in technology and communication and the
increasing openness of markets worldwide have created a new
pool of non-state players on the international stage.12
One of the most powerful new actors in the international
arena is the capital-controlling private sector.13 International
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 WL 13380873, at *1 [hereinafter
Kurdish Dilemma] (noting that "in spite of their clear identity the Kurds have
been less successful in achieving recognition than any other minority of
comparable size").
11 The American Society of International Law has devoted several meetings
exclusively to the concept of sovereignty, without resolving precisely what the
term means. See Proceedings of the 88th Annual Meeting, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 51 (1994) [hereinafter ASIL 1994 Report].
12 See Walter B. Wriston, Technology and Sovereignty, FOREIGN AFF.,
Winter 1988/89, at 63, 71 ("Although oiily a few politicians recognized the
possibilities of instant global communications, the money traders ofthe world
immediately drove their trades over the new global electronic infrastructure,
creating a new international monetary system governed by the Information
Standard.").
13 See Cable, supra note 4, at 27 (noting that "foreign exchange trading in
the world's financial centers exceeds a trillion dollars a day, a multiple of fifty
times, or more, of the daily amount of world trade and greater than the total
stock of foreign exchange reserves held by all governments"); Schmidt, supra
note 5, at 80 (asserting that the privileged access of businesses to supranational
decisionmaking has resulted in a shift from almost exclusive reliance on




capital markets are becoming essential sources of funds for many
States. The increased demand for funds, coupled with the extreme
liquidity of these markets, is enabling money managers to emerge
as important non-state actors with the ability to affect state policy
and action. Extremists have begun to recognize the power of the
purse wielded by these actors, calling it a "new kind of national
security crisis."14 However, these new roles of power, and the
consequences of their emergence, are not being addressed adequate-
ly.
Not so long ago, legal scholars could state without fear of
contradiction that "[w]hether a State is nationalist, socialist, free
market or whatever is a matter of its self-determination and
domestic jurisdiction.""5 Today, this seems to vastly overempha-
size state power. The reality is that in our current world of
interconnected markets and rapid capital mobility, all States face
stiff competition for the capital inflow they need. Monetary and
other policy decisions which affect a country's economic well-
being are no longer the sole province of the sovereign, but are
increasingly affected by the direct and indirect demands of
external actors. 16 In the fierce battle for investment capital:
Whichever country has the most stable government, the
most efficient economy, the most Westernized legal
system, the most convertible currency and the most
educated labor force, gets rewarded with investment capital
from the super [global] markets. Those countries that




14 James D. Humphrey II, Note, Foreign Affairs Powers and "The First Crisis
of the 21st Century": Congressional vs. Executive Authority and the Stabilization
Plan for Mexico, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 181, 181 (1995).
15 OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW iN THEORY AND PRACTICE
317 (Developments in Int'l Law No. 13, 1991).
16 See generally Cable, supra note 4.
1" Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Yesterday's Man, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19,
1995, S 4 (Week in Review), at 5.
1997]
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While practitioners in other fields, particularly economics and
political science, are focusing on the changes wrought by interna-
tional financial actors,18 international legal scholars lag far
behind. They fail to meaningfully address crucial issues, much less
resolve them. 9
This Article examines some of the changes occurring on the
world stage. It focuses on the emergence of powerful non-state
actors and the consequences the existence of these new actors may
have on the juridical understanding of sovereignty. Section 2
describes the traditional conceptualizations of "statehood" and
"sovereignty." It then argues that this state-centric model must be
refined into a "bundled" model to reflect today's realities. Section
3 focuses on economic power as a critical element in describing
one aspect of this "bundled" model and distinguishes the various
mechanisms through which States receive foreign funds. It
suggests that these methods and their effects can only be under-
stood within the context of the revised model. To demonstrate
this, Section 4 examines the receipt of portfolio investment by
using the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 as an example. The Peso
Crisis illustrates that the traditional understanding of the exercise
of sovereign powers grossly overstates today's reality, and that
unfettered economic self-determination is no longer possible for
States. Section 5 describes current responses to the changes on the
international stage and contends that those responses are inade-
quate.
" Areas under consideration include, among others, exchange rate policies
and currency unification. See Ilene Grabel, Marketing the Third World: The
Contradictions of Portfolio Investment in the Global Economy, in POST-
KEYNESIAN FOUNDATIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF TE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (. Harvey & J. Deprey eds., forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 28-
29, on file with authors) (discussing various methods of regulation, including
use of strin gent capital controls, volume- or price-based restrictions on
purchases and sales of portfolio investment, or a "uniform, global transaction
tax"); John R. Freeman, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association (Aug. 29 - Sept. 2, 1990).
19 See, e.g., DAVID FOLKERTS-LANDAU & TAKOTOSHI ITO, INTERNATION-
AL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS,
PROSPECTS, AND POLCY ISSUES 1 (1996) [hereinafter IMF 1996 REPORT]
(stating that the report "does not take up questions about the potential role of
international financial institutions in dealing with the consequences of the





This Article does not attempt to determine the appropriate
role the multitude of non-state actors gaining power on the
international stage should take. Rather, its goals are to highlight
that, with or without recognition, changes are being wrought in
the international legal order, and to encourage open dialogue
about both theoretical and practical responses.
2. STATE-CENTRIC AND "BUNDLED" MODELS
2.1. Traditional "State-Centric" Definitions of "State" and
"Sovereignty"
The words "state" or "sovereignty" immediately bring to mind
certain connotations.2' Traditional legal theory holds that the
State is the primary actor on the international stage and that each
State possesses equal sovereign powers. While many possible
definitions of "State" exist, a "State" is commonly described as "a
person of international law [which] should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with
the other States."' This definition derives from the historical
development of States and the concept of sovereignty as it has
developed from the Middle Ages.
After the Reformation, monarchs began to assume ultimate
authority within their defined territories. "A new era of equal
sovereigns began with the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and became
more formalized in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia."23 Monarchs
were the source of all power in their realm, with the authority to
control virtually every aspect of their subjects' lives.24 As the
20 See, e.g., Nagan, supra note 2, at 14445 (listing thirteen different ideas
with which the term may be associated).
21 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 ("The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."). Of course, it should
be noted that different conceptions of relations among world powers existed at
the time. See ASIL 1994 Report, supra note 11, at 51-52 (giving remarks of
Professor Thomas M. Franck, who noted that "independent, sovereign actors
bound by no authority, temporal or otherwise" no longer exist).
' Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. I, 165
U.N.T.S. 19, 25.
Brand, supra note 2, at 1688.
24 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLTICS AND
VALUES 9-10 (Developments in Int'l Law No. 18, 1995) (providing historical
background).
1997]
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law of nations developed, the ultimate authority of monarchs
grew from exclusive concern with power exercised over subjects
to include external influence.'
Early proponents of this definition of sovereignty apparently
believed that some limitations on this absolute power existed.26
Nevertheless, this definition provided the foundation for a state-
centric legal order, long dominant in the international arena.27
Thus, in traditional theory, sovereign attributes are typically
thought to include the ability to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over citizens of the State, equality with other States, and the
power to structure policies constrained only by the impact of
those policies on other States or by agreements entered into with
other States.2 These attributes reinforce the identification of the
State as the sole legitimate actor on the world stage, defining
"sovereignty" as the primary mechanism through which a State
maintains its standing with other state actors.
2.2. A Reconceptualization of the State-Centric Model
In light of the changes in the structure of the international
legal arena, the present understanding of sovereignty must expand.
While interstate relations will always be an important element of
international law, the exclusively state-centric approach is no
longer sufficient. Some modifications to this framework have
already occurred with the explicit inclusion of non-governmental
organizations in numerous international agreements. More
21 See INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE INDEPENDENT
STATE 3 (1974).
26 See Friedrich Kratochwil, Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of
Humanitarian Intervention?, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 21, 23
("Although the sovereign is still subject to natural law and bound by his
conscience, he now emerges as a lawgiver who faces an (at least in this respect)
undifferentiated set of subjects.").
27 Even international agreements which arguably detract from this model
depend upon it for their legitimacy; virtually all treaties and international
agreements are executed by States, and membership in international organiza-
tions is typically open oily to States. See U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1
("Membership in the United Nations is open to all ... states.").
28 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717 (1995)
(discussing three paradigms of international relations theory and exploring how
one of those theories might guide the extraterritorial application of U.S. law).
29 See, e.., U.N. CHARTER art. 71 ("The Economic and Social Council may




change is necessary, however. A theoretical framework is needed
to accurately reflect the changes occurring on a practical level.
Consequently, the position that States deal only with other States,
and that States are the only meaningful actors on the international
stage, must be abandoned.
The category of recognized actors should be expanded to
admit the new entities now exercising considerable power. Doing
so requires recognizing that non-States may possess some powers
previously considered "sovereign." Uncoupling "statehood" from
"sovereignty" facilitates a scheme in which a State can cede some
"sovereign" elements while remaining a full, legitimate internation-
al actor. Simultaneously, other non-state entities can wield
powers traditionally reserved to the sovereign without being
considered "States."
This uncoupling does not "assume some artificial life for the
state, as though the state is more than a bundle of powers and
responsibilities."" Rather, it allows explicit recognition that a
State may allocate portions of its bundle of powers to other actors
without becoming any less a State and that those actors receiving
direct or indirect allocations of power do not thereby become
"States." This "distribution of power" model also helps explain
the co-existence of the "demise-of-the-State" and the "primacy-of-
the-State" positions. Instead of becoming less important, the State
will find new ways to behave in an environment which includes
additional powerful participants.
If we can successfully detach our conceptions of statehood and
sovereignty from one another and expand our recognition of
significant actors on the international stage, what will happen to
the existing model? Will statehood and sovereignty continue to
have any relevance to international legal discourse? Some would
argue, particularly with respect to sovereignty, that both terms
tions."); Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with
International Organizations of a Universal Character, Mar. 14, 1975, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 730 (1975); see also Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States
and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar.
21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 [hereinafter Convention on Law of Treaties] (formally
acknowledging the authority of agreements involving international organiza-
tions).
, 0, Trachtman, supra note 2, at 402 (arguing that "'sovereignty' and the
state' are congruent" and that those who separate the two "assume some
artificial life for the state").
1997]
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should be banished from the vocabulary of geopolitics.3 Never-
theless, most scholars agree that the notions of statehood and
sovereignty continue to be relevant and are destined to be a part
of the dialogue regarding international legal relations for some
time to come.32 Given the likely longevity of the terms, it will
be useful to ascribe meaning to them which comports with the
behavior of participants in the international system. The current
rigid articulations of the terms, however, do not accomplish this
task.33
A functionalist conceptualization of sovereignty which reflects
this reality can be premised on a model that any American-
schooled attorney would find easily accessible. Drawing on a
favorite example from the average first-year law school Property
class, sovereignty can be understood as a combination of several
powers, rights, and obligations, just as property ownership is a
"bundle of sticks" that are divisible and transferable between
original and subsequent owners. When one property owner
transfers the right of an easement to another, other attributes
inherent in the land remain with the transferor. The recipient is
not characterized as an "owner" through possession of the
easement. That designation remains with the transferor.
Incorporating this understanding into the traditional defini-
tions of "statehood" and "sovereignty" would bring international
legal scholars in line with political scientists and international
relations theorists who conceive sovereignty as "an elastic term"
not incompatible with "individual rights, nonstate actors, or
permeable boundaries."34 Thinking of sovereignty as a "bundle
31 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 24, at 10 (stating that sovereignty is "a term
largely unnecessary and better avoided" in international law); Weiss & Chopra,
supra note 3, at 100 ("Even if sovereignty is still the working assumption at the
highest levels of government, current challenges to the concept lead to the
conclusion that it is becoming a dead letter of international law.").
32 See ASIL 1994 Report, supra note 11, at 1-2; see also Nagan, supra note 2,
at 14445.
33 'Some may argue that the definition of terms is not relevant and that,
regardless of the phraseology, the actors in question will continue their
behavior. See Nagan, supra note 2, at 14445. I agree wholeheartedly with the
idea that non-state actors will exert influence even if we refuse to modify the
state-centric model which denies them significance. However, that should not
prevent an attempt to create a model which includes them while simultaneously
changing the terms of the dialogue.




of sticks," however, fails to establish the definition of sovereignty
just as thinking of property ownership in a similar fashion does
not cement what it means to "own" a particular asset. Recogniz-
ing that sovereignty, like ownership, contains many constituent
elements may help explain why and how "sovereign sticks" can be
passed to non-state actors in the growing ranks of players in the
international arena.
This approach leaves us with several important considerations.
First, what fixed attributes must an entity possess for it to be
considered a "State"? Can a minimum threshold be established?
Second, what elements constitute the "bundle of sticks" of
sovereignty? Are there any elements of sovereignty that are non-
delegable if a State wishes to maintain its status? Third, to whom
may those "sticks" be passed? The international community has
long been comfortable with the idea that some powers may be
ceded to international organizations through entry into interna-
tional agreements. However, the international community may
balk at accepting other entities as recipients of sovereign status.
Finally, in what manner may the "sticks" be passed? Will the
mechanism of passing the "sticks" be significant?
2.2.1. A "Sovereign" Bundle of "Sticks"
Recognizing sovereignty as being comprised of a bundle of
"sticks" facilitates a more accurate understanding of an internation-
al legal order populated by many different actors wielding
differing degrees of power and control. States, while still the
central feature of the model, comprise but one subset of actors;
other, non-state actors assume some of the powers traditionally
associated with "statehood" or "sovereignty." Of course, this
model of passing power from State to State, from State to
organizations of States, or from State to non-state actors, assumes
3' Examples of ceding power to facilitate formulation of economic policy
are predominant. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implemen-
tation Act, 19 U.S.C. SS 3301-3473 (1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1995); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 60
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Non-economic
powers are also freely ceded through such mechanisms. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 43, para. 1 (requiring all Members "to make available to the
Security Council ... armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage").
19971
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that an identifiable "State" will continue to exist and that all will
recognize it as such, regardless of how many "sticks" have been
passed. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the necessary
elements of "statehood."
2.2.1.1. "Claim" v. "Exercise" Elements
Attributes of statehood must consist of those "sticks" necessary
to claim state status. These are distinct from those "sticks" used
by a State in the exercise of its power.36 "Claim" attributes do
nothing more than create a minimum threshold. Although an
entity cannot be designated a State without them, their presence
tells us little about the behavior of that State or how it uses its
powers.
This inquiry requires consideration of the use a State makes of
its "exercise" elements. Although debatable, the starting point for
distinguishing "claim" and "exercise" components is the traditional
definition of a State as set forth above. From there, we can refine
further the stated elements of a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into interstate
relations. These criteria contain numerous powers and rights, and
Professor Louis Henkin succintly captures many of these.37
Henkin "decomposes" the concept of sovereignty in an attempt to
identify those elements which "constitute essential characteristics
and indicia of Statehood today."3" Included on his list are
independence, equality, autonomy, "personhood," territorial
authority and integrity, and impermeability.39
Henkin's list contains both "claim" and "exercise" attributes.
The task now is to separate the two, designating "claim" compo-
nents as "statehood" elements and "exercise" components as
"sovereignty" elements. As with any attempt to place concrete
6 Daniel Turp articulated this distinction between a claim to sovereignty
and the exercise of sovereign power. See ASIL 1994 Report, supra note 11, at
86. 1 prefer to use "State" or "statehood" as the object of the claim on the
status prong rather than the claim to sovereignty that Turp suggests. I also
prefer sovereign power as the action being undertaken on the "exercise" prong
as this terminology better tracks the "bundle of sticks" model and simplifies the
conceptualizations of "statehood" as fixed and determinate, and of "sovereignty"
as fluid.





STATEHOOD AND SO VEREIGNTY
labels on intangible concepts, this effort at parsing is likely subject
to endless criticism. Centuries have passed without resolving the
analogous problem in property law of determining attributes
essential for "ownership."4° The answer there depends entirely
on how "ownership" is defined, just as the determination of
elements essential for "statehood" rests on the meaning attributed
to the term "state." Nonetheless, we should not allow our
recognition of alternative articulations to prevent us from
engaging in this inquiry. It is of less concern to this author that
everyone agree on the particular placement of an element; rather,
it is more important that this model explains the ability to
transfer power into non-state hands by passing off "exercise"
elements exists and is exercised frequently.
2.2.1.2. The "Claim" Elements for "Statehood"
A review of Henkin's list, which identifies certain essential
attributes of statehood, reveals that only a few elements are
actually necessary to mark that status. The vast majority of
characteristics associated with a "State" may be reallocated to
other States, state groupings and even non-state actors. This
reallocation may be carried out in varying degrees without
undermining the statehood of the allocating State, or wholly
conferring such status on a non-state recipient. Therefore, further
distillation of the elements is necessary.41
2.2.1.2.1. Independence
"Independence," as used by Professor Henkin, means "separate-
ness, distinctness from other such entities ... physically and
politically."42 When considering "independence" as a "claim"
element of sovereignty, it is helpful to distinguish physical and
political independence. To the extent that "independence" of a
State defines its physical identity and separateness, independence
can be seen as a central "claim" attribute of statehood.
40 See generallyJOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES (1993).
41 Although it is possible to place different labels on similar concepts, some
may argue about the ensuing categorizations. Regardless of the titles used,
however, the conceptual premise holds.
4 HENKIN, supra note 24, at 10.
1997]
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A demarcated geographic territory enables the baseline
identification of the "State" entity to occur and creates a physical
sphere controlled by one State. Even this bare minimum
prerequisite for statehood may be disputed.43 However, its
acceptance in the international community is clearly evidenced by
the actions of the former Soviet-bloc countries that sought to
establish territorial boundaries to be considered as independent
entities.44 Even when those seeking statehood do so from
outside the defined physical territory, as with governments in
exile, they depend on the existence of a definable territory as a
foundation of their legitimacy. Control over a physical territory
thus defines an entity entitled to seek statehood.
Control over physical territory also creates boundaries for
weighing state action. The existence of determinate boundaries
demarcating one State from another underlies much of the
international legal structure and dictates in large degree the state's
ability to act with political independence. Under international
law, the behavior of a State depends largely on whether its actions
take place within or outside of its territorial boundaries. 4' For
instance, actions based on religious or cultural reasons carried out
within a State's boundaries will be tolerated if exercised exclusive-
ly within that State's territory, although such actions might not
be accepted outside the territory.46 Thus, the physical indepen-
4 It is, I suppose, possible to imagine a State without physical boundaries
existing in cyberspace, but despite technological advances, this eventuality
remains far in the future.
" Efforts at establishing requisite territorial boundaries have met with
ying degrees of success. Some, such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, have
full statehood as demonstrated by their admission into the United Nations on
September 17, 1991. See Shoe Leather, Not Limos, Gets New Baltic Ambassadors
to UN, AP, Sept. 23, 1991, 1991 WL 6201683, at *1. Others have yet to
achieve this result. See Yeltsin Rejects Chechnya, supra note 10, at *1 (noting
Russia's refusal to recognize the independence of the so-called "break- away"
republic of Chechnya).
41 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.").
46 One striking example of this is the ability of States to engage in practices
such as female genital mutilation. While this practice is condemned y many
States, including the U.S. which recently permitted a claim of threatened
mutilation to serve as the basis for an asylum application, it is routinely
practiced in many States without official international interference. See Fauziya
Kasinga, I. & N. Dec. 3278, File A73-476-695 Gune 1996).
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dence of a State continues to act as a central defining characteris-
tic.
However, as discussed below, it is clear that what occurs
within a State's defined territory may be strongly influenced, if
not mandated, by another State or non-state actor. Therefore, the
traditional meaning of independence as "freedom from the
influence, guidance, or control of another or others,"47 is not an
essential element of statehood. Independence itself must be
viewed as being comprised of several "sticks." As the following
discussion of autonomy will highlight, total political independence
is not a "claim" element of statehood. A State may pass off some
"sticks" of political independence without losing its claim to that
status so long as it retains some identifiable physical territory.
2.2.1.2.2. Identifiable Government
An identifiable government, a necessary complement to
independence, is another "claim" element. If personhood is to
have any meaning, there must be some individual entitled to assert
it both domestically and internationally. The presence of an
identifiable government enables the voice of a State to be heard so
that it may assert the necessary claims. Although the issue of
what kinds of government the world community will recognize
may, at times, be controversial 48 and the parties in power may
change rapidly, some identifiable group must exist to represent the
entity claiming statehood.
17 AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIoNARY 917 (3d ed. 1992).
" When Brigadier General Raoul Cedras led a military coup to overthrow
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's democratic Haitian government in September, 1991,
ministers of the Organization of American States ("OAS") announced that "the
OAS would recognize only Aristide's government as legitimate within the
inter-American system." John C. Pierce, The Haitian Crisis and the Future of
Collective Enforcement of Democratic Governance, LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.,
Winter 1996, at 3.
Controversy also arose when President Jimmy Carter announced in 1978
that the United States would normalize diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China and that U.S. diplomatic relations with the Taiwan would
end. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHLIp R. TREMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
470 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that the withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan in
favor of the People's Republic of China "ended nearly 30 years of a complicated
relationship between the United States, Taiwan, and the [People's Republic of
China]").
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2.2.1.2.3. Population
Although not included as a distinct element on Professor
Henkin's list of essential attributes, existence of a population is a
typical prerequisite to statehood. Without a population, there can
be no actors to take roles in the government necessary to assert
the "claim" elements of statehood. While it is possible to imagine
that the identifiable government and the population of a State are
coterminous, a realistic understanding of state structure includes
the existence of a population governed by an identified govern-
ment. Indeed, underlying each of Henkin's attributes is an
assumption that the entity possessing such elements has some
determinate population.49 Although the population need not be
fixed and stable, some group of people must constitute the State.
2.2.1.2.4. Personhood
Perhaps the ultimate "claim" element, and one closely related
to independence, is personhood. It is critical to understand for
our model of statehood that personhood, like independence,
enjoys a very limited meaning. Personhood means only the
recognition of that entity as an international actor. It identifies
those entitled to claim statehood. Personhood does not describe
what powers, rights, or obligations attach to the achievement of
that status. That will be addressed in the consideration of the
"exercise" elements of sovereignty.
The functioning of the international legal order begins,
although it does not end, with the notion that States are the main
participants"0 and certain roles are open only to States.5 There-
41 See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 10.
so See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1; id. art. 9, para. 1; id. art. 93, para. 1.
Scholars generally agree that the international system "was premised on the idea
that States were the central actors," but that other actors have become
increasingly prominent. Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction:
International Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International
Society, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 5-9.
si Full membership in many international organizations, for example, is
limited to States. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 3, 4; Articles of Agreement of
the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39
(entered into force Dec. 27, 1945) [hereinafter IME Articles]. Weiss and Chopra
argue, however, that such non-state actors as international organizations,
corporations, national independence movements, and even individuals have
attained recognition as international "persons." Weiss & Chopra, supra note
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fore, entities seeking access to the international arena must
establish the legal fiction of personhood which allows them to
effectuate this right of participation.
What then is "personhood"? Personhood is perhaps best
understood through an analogy to corporate law: use of the
corporate form to establish a legal fiction. Upon the filing of
proper documents and receipt of official approval, a company can
gain recognition as a fictional entity, a corporation. Personhood
serves a similar function for States. It gives form to an entity
which permits other States to recognize that entity as another
State. Personhood is a prerequisite to statehood, but does not
mandate it. Many groups may identify themselves as "persons"
under international law but still do not receive recognition as a
State. For example, the Kurds in northern Iraq claim personhood
for their group because they recognize that it is essential to
making a claim for recognition as a State. However, they have
not yet received international recognition as a State.5z Another
situation highlighting the interplay between personhood and
statehood is the uncertain status of the Palestinian Authority.3
Although most would agree that the Palestinian Authority has
qualities inherent in personhood, the international community has
not yet granted it status as an independent State. These examples
illustrate that personhood is ultimately a prerequisite, but not a
guarantor, of statehood.
These four elements - independence as established by a
defined physical territory, personhood, an identifiable government
and population - are the essential "claim" elements of state status.
Once an entity claims statehood successfully, the issue of deter-
mining what powers, rights and obligations the new status confers
on the entity arises. That question is best answered by examining
the remaining elements identified by Henkin, elements relating to
the "exercise" of sovereign power.
3, at 98.
52 See Kurdish Dilemma, supra note 10, at *1.
5' See Douglas Jehl, In Hebron Accord, The Future Begins to Take Shape,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1997, at 6 (recognizing that "more and more, the emerging
Palestinian area is beginning to resemble a state" although "officials remain
wary about using that charged word").
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2.2.2. The 'Exercise" Elements of Sovereignty
The "exercise" elements of sovereignty are parts of the bundle
of "sticks" inherent in statehood. Unlike the "claim" elements,
the "exercise" elements are allocable. A State may directly or
indirectly pass some or all of these elements on to other actors.
Since this distribution occurs regularly on the international stage,
the notion of allocable "exercise" elements should not prove
problematic to the construction of a new theoretical model. In
fact, it would be more troubling to rely on the prevailing
theoretical structure of international law, since it does not
accurately reflect reality.
2.2.2.1. Autonomy
Autonomy refers to a State's ability to act independent of
external control, unless it openly consents to such imposition. 
4
Autonomy, in layman's terms, traditionally means the freedom to
act independently, to choose a course of action without con-
straints. 5  Autonomy for sovereignty purposes is far more
limited. Since every action taken by a State affects its position in
the international community, full unfettered autonomy does not
and cannot exist in international law. From explicit prohibitions
on state action, as in laws prohibiting genocide and torture,56 to
the implicit check of international opinion and response, con-
straints on autonomy are endemic. Many state actions have far-
reaching ramifications, and every State must consider carefully the
repercussions of its decisions prior to selecting its course of action.
For example, a State needs to consider possible penalties for
choosing a particular trade regime, or what international response
14 See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 11.
55 Indeed, "autonomy" is defined as "the condition or quality of... not
being controlled by others or by outside forces," or as "independence."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY, supra note 47, at 126.
56 See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMI-
NATION 20 (1990) (noting that "some fundamental human rights norms have
achieved the status of customary international law of jus cogens, including the
prohibition against genocide and systematic racial discrimination"). Hannum
further asserts the legitimacy of the power of international bodies to review the
human rights situation of any country, "as human rights cannot be said to fall
essentialy within the domestic jurisdiction' of a state within the meaning of
article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter." Id. These international laws and norms




will arise if it decides to pursue particular political agendas.
These limitations on state autonomy, which also inhere in
individual autonomy, do not mean that the term has no meaning
as an "exercise" element of sovereignty. States may pass some of
their "sticks" of autonomy to external actors voluntarily or
involuntarily, but may also retain many for themselves. The
process through which international legal structures are created
illustrates how this division and distribution is possible. As States
recognize the need to coordinate their behavior, they voluntarily
enter into "groupings." Through this conscious exercise of their
autonomy, States create laws governing their own actions and
together craft frameworks for international organizations.
Additionally, international legal documents consistently
recognize the autonomous nature of States. 57 Even when acting
in concert, States retain a large degree of autonomy in their
decision-making. The international legal structure protects that
autonomy to the fullest extent possible. The United Nations
Charter, for example, states that "[n]othing contained [herein]
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
58
Of course, autonomy is not, and cannot be, absolute. This
comports a view of autonomy as an "exercise" element of
sovereignty, comprised of numerous "sticks" and transferable to
various other entities. The "sticks" may be passed directly, such
as when a State signs an international agreement limiting its
actions,"' or indirectly, when a State is constrained through
operation of international law. Examples of the latter include the
genocide and torture prohibitions, and forcible restrictions on the
exercise of a basic function of autonomy, such as the enforcement
of no-fly zones over Iraq during the Persian Gulf War.'"
57 This recognition is often implicit. See, e.g., O.A.S. CHARTER ch. VII;
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, pmbl.,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("sovereign equality and independence").
s U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
s See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER; O.A.S. CHARTER.
No-fly zones "prohibit the entry of unauthorized aircraft into airspace
over specified territory," and permit "outside powers to intervene in dangerous
conflict areas with relatively little risk." Timothy P. Mcflmail, No-Fly Zones:
The Imposition and Enforcement ofAir Exclusion Regimes Over Bosnia and Iraq,
17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 35, 35 (1994).
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
A State may also pass a portion of autonomy without any
overt recognition. This occurs when external actors exert political
or economic pressures that constrain States. This covert transfer
of autonomy is more problematic than the others because, often,
it is not explicitly acknowledged. The lack of acknowledgement
prevents passage from being properly factored into policy
decisions and perpetuates the illusion that only States matter. The
difficulties in this type of transfer of the autonomy element of
sovereignty are discussed in greater detail below.
2.2.2.2. Impermeability
Impermeability is another "exercise" attribute of sovereignty.
Stemming from the imperium that princes held within their own
territories,61 impermeability considers the lack of impact that
actions taken by others may have within a State. 62 As an initial
premise, absolute impermeability dictates that other actors may
not interfere in a State's relations with its citizens. 63  The
territorial boundaries of a State create a region within which, in
theory, no external actor may directly intrude.
This premise clearly overstates the nature of impermeability
today. While there is still great strength in the idea that a State
is the final authority over actions taking place within its territory,
full impermeability cannot exist in modern society. The very
nature of an increasingly globalized, interconnected world disposes
of the possibility of a State operating in isolation, even within its
own defined territory. With advanced technology, intrusion no
longer requires physical presence.64
61 See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 12 (stating that "territorial inviolability
and the state's authority within it" came to be seen as aspects of the imperme-
ability of statehood).
62 See id.
63 See id. (defining traditional impermeability as a rule that "other states
may have no dealings with any of the inhabitants of another state without its
consent").
' The worldwide attention on the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989,
made possible primarily through television and other modern modes of
communication, provides a vivid example of such intrusion and its impact. See
generally Emily MacFarquhar, On the Defensive: As Washington Debates Whether
to Get Tough, China Braces Itself, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 27, 1991, at




Instead, States pass some "sticks" of impermeability to others
through their participation in the international community. As
demonstrated by a State's entry into human rights treaties, which
grant bodies such as the United Nations the power to monitor
and sanction States for internal actions, some of this transfer is
purposeful.5 Furthermore, intrusions into state impermeability
can occur when one State attempts, through its own laws, to
govern affairs in other States. A good example of this is the
controversial Helms-Burton legislation recently enacted in the
United States.66 Many other examples could be cited to show
that States are never wholly impermeable. It is sufficient,
however, to recognize this attribute as an allocable portion of
sovereign power - an "exercise" rather than a "claim" element.
Even though another actor may exert influence within a State's
territory, it is not necessarily the case that State is no longer a
State. Rather, we recognize that a portion of the sovereign
element of impermeability has been reallocated or, alternatively,
reappropriated.
65 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply directly to internal armed
conflicts. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363,75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 278. These impose "on the parties to an
internal conflict immutable legal obligations .... " Robert Kogod Goldman,
International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch's Experience in Monitoring
Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 49, 57 (1993).
Generally, such international treaties express humanitarian principles in
order "to safeguard civilians and nonmilitary property, prohibit certain methods
of excessively cruel and destructive warfare, and restrict the testing and use of
certain types of weapons." Neil A. F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection
of the Environment, and Human Rights, 8 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 71
(1995).
66 See 22 U.S.C. S 6034 (1997). As a result of Helms-Burton, "[f]or the first
time, foreign companies that profit from American property expropriated in
Cuba will be liable in American courts." Linda Robinson et al., Cuba Takes a
StiT Belt: Washington Wants to Hurt Castro by Punishing Foreign Firms on the
Island. But Will They Go?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 29, 1996, at 36.
This legislation prompted British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind to assert
that "[n]o one country has the right to tell firms in another country how they
should behave in third countries." Id. at 36-37.
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2.2.2.3. Equality
The final element on Professor Henkin's list of attributes'
is equality. This element, much like autonomy and impermeabili-
ty, remains a theoretic ideal of international law: that each State
be considered fully equal with one another.68 However, in
practice, absolute equality does not exist. States differ in many
respects, including size, structure, and economic strength, each of
which affects the states' stature and power in the international
community. If equality were viewed as a "claim" element, it
could only be in the Orwellian sense that all States are equal, but
some are more equal than others.69
Equality is an "exercise" element rather than a "claim"
element. States are not truly equal, but rather, pass some of their
right to claim "equality" to other actors in order to become more
equal and to attempt to level the playing field through group
action. For example, recognizing that absolute equality cannot
exist, States band together in regional organizations such as the
Organization of American States ("OAS") to achieve a more
"equal" footing with larger, more powerful States or state
groupings.70 The idealized notion of equality of States remains a
central tenet of international law. The practical achievement of
some approximation of ideal equality is obtainable, however, only
through allocation to others of some of the "sticks" comprising
67 Henkin certainly identifies other elements, but those addressed here
capture the essential components of sovereignty. See HENKIN, supra note 24,
at 10.
68 The term "sovereignty" has been discussed in the Meeting of the
American Society of International Law as being "used as a surrogate for what
was really 'statehood,' and of various attributes ascribed to the traditional state,
such as 'independence,' 'equality,' 'autonomy,' 'domestic jurisdiction,' and
'reserved domain,' 'self-determination,' or 'non-intervention.'" Richard B.
Bilder, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American
Viewpoint, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 9, 12 (1994). See also J.D. van der Vyver,
Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 9, 73 (1991) (stating
that the classification of general international legal norms entails "principles
establishing the main sovereign rights of states and peoples (equality and self-
determination of peoples, non-interference)").
69 See GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (4th Signet Classics ed., 1960)
("All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.").
70 See O.A.S. CHARTER art. 9 (stating that member States are Ijuridically




STA TEHOOD AND SO VEREIGNTY
the equality element.
Properly conceived, then, the list of elements attributed to
state status can be distinguished as "claim" elements and "exercise"
elements. "Claim" elements create the minimum qualifications
necessary for an entity to establish state status. Although
"exercise" elements inhere in that status, a State may allocate them
to other actors.7 ' This distinction does not diminish the impor-
tance of the State as an international actor. It simply permits
recognition of the emergence of other, non-state actors on the
world stage. Having recognized this shift from a pure state-centric
model to one that recognizes non-state actors, the inquiry then
shifts direction. To which actors are the "sticks" of various
elements of sovereign power passed? What actors have already
emerged? Do others wait in the wings?
3. OPERATION OF THE "BUNDLED" MODEL IN GENERAL
3.1. To Whom May a State Pass Sovereign "Sticks"?
If States may reallocate portions of their sovereign powers
without diminishing their state status in any way, are there
restrictions on entities eligible to exercise these powers in place of
the State? A traditionalist answer might be that only other States
or groupings of States can receive the "sticks." However, a model
separating state status from the exercise of sovereign powers
permits us to approach this question differently. Transferable
powers may be exercised by any non-state entity because the
acquiring entity does not achieve statehood simply by receiving
the "sticks" of statehood.
A return to the property law analogy demonstrates this on a
more practical level. States that enter voluntarily into internation-
al political and economic groupings, such as the United Nations
or the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade ("GATT"), pass
some of their "sticks" of sovereign power to these larger entities.
These bodies then act on behalf of their member States. While
there is some dispute over the proper scope of their actions, there
is no doubt that these types of entities have full authority under
international law to exercise what was once considered strictly
state power. At the same time, no one can contend that the
GATT's administrative body is state-like because of its substantial
71 See Trachtman, supra note 2, at 399-400.
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influence in the establishment of trade terms. Powers may be
reallocated from States without creating new States as a result of
such reallocation.
Of course, entities like the United Nations are composed of
States, so the transfer of elements to these member states does not
fundamentally undermine the centrality of the transferring State.
Much greater alterations to the traditional model are effected
when the "sticks" are passed to entities not composed exclusively
of States. Unlike well-established intergovernmental organiza-
tions, the traditional model does not readily recognize these newer
entities as appropriate recipients of sovereign "sticks." However,
they do fit neatly into the reconceptualized model. One kind of
entity that has already received some degree of recognition is the
non-governmental organization ("NGO"). A prominent example
is the International Red Cross, which is recognized by the
international community and which receives some "sticks" of
sovereignty from States so as to take actions within their respec-
tive territories.7
Another important category of non-state actors capable of
exercising allocated powers are non-governmental entities who
participate in directing the international flow of capital. Among
others, this group includes commercial banks, company executives
responsible for foreign investment, and international portfolio
managers.73 The behavior of these actors differs significantly
from NGOs, but it is indisputable that through power of the
purse, these entities have the capacity to wield substantial
influence over the domestic and international economic policies
of States. This ability to exert financial influence shows that
States reallocate some power to these actors, whether the realloca-
7 See Dianne M. Kueck, Comment, Using International PoliticalAgreements
to Protect Endangered Species: A Proposed Model, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 345, 354 (1995) (rioting that "[t]he conventions consistently guarantee the
International Red Cross the ability to carry out its traditional functions");
Donat Pharand, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: A Canadian
Vlewpoint, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.. 19, 29 (1994) ("Intervention by the Red Cross and
other humanitarian organizations, to come to the rescue of victims of armed
conflicts, is specifically provided for in one of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and the two Optional Protocols of 1977.").





tion is formally acknowledged or not.74
International law explicitly acknowledges and accommodates
some of these shifts in financial power. For example, the
extensive systems of international regulation over banking
activities75 and limited recognition of business corporations on
the international legal stage demonstrate the ability of States to
acknowledge their reallocation of "sticks."7 6
Other transfers, however, are not yet acknowledged.77
Recognition of the changes in allocation of power is critical to the
accurate portrayal of today's international stage. Whether explicit
recognition of the shift away from a state-centric model will alter
the functioning of the new model is discussed further below.
What is clear, however, is that the game and the players have
changed. To better understand the new framework, all relevant
parties and the "sticks" they can receive should be identified. In
74 It is true that financial and mercantile interests have long had a
significant voice in international affairs. Currently, however, the demarcation
between politics and finance is blurred and the international influence and
importance of economic interests is rapidly expanding.
7s A major source of international banking regulation is the Standing
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, now commonly
known as the Basle Committee, which was formed by the central bankers of
the Group of Ten ("G-10") industrial countries. The objectives of the
Committee are "to share information about banks and regulatory systems" and
to ensure "that no international bank would be permitted to escape supervi-
sion." Ethan B. Kapstein, Shockproof The End of the Financial Crisis, 75
FOREIGN AFF. 2, 34 (1996).
76 Given the recognition of multinational corporations as significant players
in the international arena, attempts to regulate them have been underway for
some time. To date, these attempts have proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless,
the willingness of states to engage in this exercise shows that the international
structure can expand from the state-centric approach. See, e.g., U.N. CODE OF
CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, U.N.C.T.C. CURRENT
STUDIES, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/4 (1988); see generally Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Sovereignty, International Law and the United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc ORDER 310 (Detlev C.
Dicke ed., 1987) (discussing the U.N. Code of Conduct).
Further evidence of the importance of these non-state economic actors is
the recognition given to them by some international courts. See, e.g., Texaco
Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (Dupuy, Arb.
1977); BP Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (Lagergren,
Arb. 1974).
77 As discussed above, although private money managers now wield
significant powers, state authorities are loath to admit their influence. See infra
Part 3.4.3.
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order to identify the new players and the roles they play, we must
understand how these "sticks" are passed and how this mechanism
of transfer will affect the larger framework of international law.
3.2. The Mechanics of Transfer of "Exercise" Elements
The methods by which a State may reallocate "exercise"
elements are numerous, and it is critical that they are properly
understood and identified. As discussed below, the prevailing
international legal model fails to recognize transfers of power that
occur every day. This failure perpetuates a system where
unacknowledged actors have enormous influence. If the ability to
reallocate power and the mechanisms by which these power shifts
occur are understood and dealt with ex ante, appropriate measures
can be taken to integrate these unacknowledged actors into the
international legal framework. States and other participants in the
system need to know all available information in order to
determine the best course of action in the international arena.
This requires an understanding of who the players are and the
powers they possess.
It also requires understanding what is meant by "transfer." As
used herein, "transfer" includes all methods by which "exercise"
elements change hands. A transfer may involve an intentional act
by a State, or may occur without such an act when a transfer of
an "exercise" element assumes it. A State may acknowledge a
transfer, or may deny it even if other actors recognize the
reallocation. The different methods of transfer that exist are
discussed below.
3.2.1. Open, Intentional Transfers to State Groupings
As mentioned above, States allocate some of their "exercise"
elements each time they join an international organization. By
becoming a member of the larger entity, a State reduces its ability
to act freely.7 8 Instead, the organization dictates those decisions,
which absent membership would be within the discretion of the
State. Ordinarily those decisions would be limited, for example,
7' For example, a member of the GATT may not arbitrarily impose non-





only by fear of retaliation, by the State's treaty obligations.7 9
For a number of reasons, this type of transfer is the least problem-
atic for those concerned with maintaining the "primacy-of-the-
State."
First, the transfer is made to an entity comprised entirely of
other States. This does not necessitate the recognition of any
additional actors who could detract from the centrality of States.
Second, the decision to join such an organization is itself an
exercise of sovereign power. A State assesses the relative costs and
benefits of membership and acts accordingly. That many States
do choose to join highlights the allocative nature of sovereignty.
That States willingly participate in a "pooling of sovereignty "sO
raises another important aspect of this open, intentional transfer
of power to state groupings: it is not an all-or-nothing process.
In many cases, States retain significant authority to negotiate with
the larger body. For example, typically States may selectively
make reservations to treaty provisions with which they choose
not to comply.-' Since the allocative process is open and inten-
tional when state groupings are involved, structures and processes
exist to accommodate and facilitate allocation.
Open, intentional transfers of power to entities comprised of
other States fit neatly into a traditional model of international law
that includes the allocative aspect of sovereignty. This is so
because such transfers retain States as the primary players, dealing
with one another in familiar ways. However, other increasingly
common methods of transfer exist which do not fit as comfort-
ably in the traditional model. As discussed below, these additional
allocative processes would be easily accommodated by a model
distinguishing "claim" and "exercise" elements in state powers.
79 Even States that do not sign, or that make reservations to treaties, face
constraints on their behavior if the collective body sets a standard for behavior
because the non-signatory might then be found in violation of customary
international law. For example, all states are subject to the ban on genocide.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 278.
o See ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 1 (1986) (discussing the enhanced sovereignty of Britain as a
member of the European Economic Community).
"i See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 29, arts. 19,
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3.2.2. De Facto Transfers Involving Non-State Actors
3.2.2.1. Overt Transfers
Some transfers of sovereign power to non-state actors have
already been mentioned. Such transfers occur when States allow
non-governmental organizations ('NGOs") a role on the interna-
tional stage. This allocative process differs from state-centric
transfer of sovereign power in two ways. First, the recipients of
the "sticks" are not other States or state groupings. The presence
of a non-state actor immediately alters the pure state-centric
model, challenging the centrality of the State. Further, States may
not openly acknowledge that the reallocation occurs, perhaps
because the traditional framework cannot easily accommodate the
shifts of power. Lack of recognition does not mean the realloca-
tion does not occur. NGOs undoubtedly do exercise powers in
the international community. For example, Amnesty Internation-
al, a non-state actor, has a presence and exercises some degree of
influence in many parts of the world, even though many States
argue against its legitimacy."2
NGOs are beginning to gain acceptance and to exert more
influence in the international community,83 despite the fact that
their proper function remains a topic of some debate.8 4  Al-
82 See Wendy Schoener, Non-Governmental Organizations and Global
Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 537,
556 (1997) (describing Amnesty International as "one of the most significant
human rights NGOs"); Kathryn Sikkink, Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the
Americas: Historical Precursors and Current Practices, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 705,
712 (1997) (describing the reaction of a Panamanian legislator to an Amnesty
International report criticizing the Panamanian government's decision to
pardon almost one thousand human rights offenders).
3 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE WORLD BANK: CORPORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (Samuel Paul &
Arturo Israd eds., 1991) (noting that "recent years have witnessed the
emergence of. . . NGOs as an increasingly visible and forceful presence").
" Some argue for a broader role to be played by NGOs. See Steve
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U.PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 331 (1996) (arguing that NGOs
should be given the opportunity to participate in the work of the World
Trade Organization"); Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment
Debate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1279(1992) (questioning the trade regime as the preeminent system of
environmental regulations).




though the endemic reluctance to recognize non-state actors
perpetuates this debate, it does not obscure the fact that a
reallocation of power has occurred with the emergence of this
group. By their nature, NGOs work strenuously to have their
voices heard and positions implemented on the world stage. Their
success demonstrates an overt reallocation of sovereign "sticks,"
even if States do not acknowledge it. The presence of unified
vocal groups serving as the recipients of transferred sovereign
power enables their general recognition as increasingly important
actors on the world stage.8" It also highlights the need to fashion
appropriate roles for NGOs.
A different type of overt transfer occurs when States choose
to privatize various state-owned industries. Although privatiza-
tion may take several forms, each results in the sale by govern-
ments of state-owned business enterprises, and a transfer of
operations and assets from the public sector to the private sector.
Indeed, "[p]rivatization changes the distribution of power within
a society, as it diminishes control of the economy by the [s]tate
and by [g]overnment appointed managers."86
Thus, through the privatization process, States allocate some
of their "sticks" to the market. These shifts are overt and
typically are subject to strict controls by the government effecting
the sale. 7 Further, the purchaser of the privatized business, or
the recipient of the State's "sticks," is ordinarily subject to post-
transaction regulation by the State to ensure that the extent of
transfer is not excessive.
88
ments such as the GATT, which do not permit participation by NGOs,
support this view. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA 7T;, The
IC & Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1065 (1994).
s5 See Schoener, supra note 82, at 564 (discussing the role of transnational
NGOs in bringing about the demise of the Argentine junta).
86 The Privatization Experience: Strategies and Implications for Small Business
Development: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus., 103rd Cong., 2nd
Sess. 5 (1994) (statement of James A. Waddell, Partner, Office of Government
Services, and Executive Director of International Privatization Group, Price
Waterhouse).
87 See generally American Bar Association, Introduction: Privatization - The
Global Scale-Back of Government Involvement in National Economics, 48 ADMIN.
L. REV. 435 (1996) (discussing the privatization process in various countries and
industries).
88 "Perhaps the greatest effect of privatization is that the government
maintains a new role as regulator." Id. at 668.
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3.2.2.2. Covert Transfers
Another type of de facto transfer occurs when "sticks" are
passed not to an organized entity, but to disparate actors who
may not be clearly identified. This type of transfer frequently
involves private economic actors and often takes place in a non-
public fashion. While many kinds of covert transfers may
occur,89 in the interest of simplicity, this Article focuses on one:
a significant covert transfer daily in the area of economic
investment activity.
On today's global stage, money is power and there are many
private actors who control pools of capital large enough to be of
significant concern to States. As demand for this capital increases,
pressure is placed on States to implement particular policies to
create favorable investment climates.90 Thus an indirect, covert
reallocation takes place as States yield some degree of control over
their economic programs and policies to those who direct
international capital flows.
Due to the mechanics of the shift, this transfer is rarely, if
ever, acknowledged. Unlike a transfer to an NGO, no unified
group is eager to identify itself as a recipient of the "sticks." Since
this is an indirect transfer, no immediately identifiable negotiating
partner sits across the table. Instead, "market forces" drive
decisionmaking. Believers in a free market will find nothing
wrong with this result, and this Article is not a challenge to such
a system. However, for purposes of structuring a framework that
accurately captures the relevant actors on the international stage,
the players in the market must be identified.
"' Other examples include reallocation of "sticks" to multi-national
corporations or to anti-governmental groups demanding changes in policy.
" See Cable, supra note 4, at 27 ("Global financial markets have several
major implications for the economic sovereignty of countries. Capital is now
so mobile that markets will ensure that holders of financial assets receive
roughly the same, risk adjusted, real return everywhere. Any country that
offers significantly lower returns will experience capital outflow and a rapidly
depreciating exchange rate.. .. Any government thxat attempts an alternative,
'reflationar' strategy and neglects these financial market fundamentals ... risksa financial crisis. The sheer scale of profit-seeking finance capital that can bemobilized in cutrrency markets far exceeds what any government, or even




One critical set of players whose presence has neither been
adequately addressed nor acknowledged is international money
managers, private actors with control over the tremendous
resources in pension and mutual fund accounts. These actors,
through their power over portfolio investment, are changing the
international framework. While States may outwardly appear to
be making independent economic policy decisions, there are
money managers behind the scenes who operate much like stage
directors orchestrating the movements of actors.
These "'hot' money players ... who deal in what might be
called impatient capital"91 force the passing of "sticks." This may
not always lead to bad consequences; in fact, the desire to create
favorable investment climates often leads to sound, strong
economic policies. 92 However, as we will see, it may also have
the opposite effect, as with the Mexican Peso Crisis. To under-
stand the power of money managers at a basic level, a brief
examination of portfolio investment and its role in international
capital movements is necessary. The role of portfolio investment
can best be understood through a comparison of the various types
of international capital movements.
3.3. The Relative Exercise of Sovereign Power in Various
International Capital Movements
Since their emergence as recognized entities, States have been
concerned with their role in the international order and with
increasing their stature therein. Economic strength is one clear
indicator of state power. To enhance their position, States
throughout history have entered into legal and other arrangements
to protect and further their economic interests. 3 Although these
agreements span a wide universe, for the purposes of this Article
they fall into two categories based on the identity of the parties.
91 Tom Petruno, Global Money - Free Flows, Free Falls, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1995, S 1, at A26.
92 For instance, Mexico liberalized trade policies and investment regimes,
exchange controls and took other, arguably "good" economic policy steps to
attract foreign investment. See Enrich Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encourag-
ing Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing
Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 539 (1996).
"' See, e.g., GATT, supra note 35; Organization of Economic Co-operative
Development Declaration on International Investment, 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976).
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The first category includes agreements between States in multi-
and bilateral contexts.94  The second category encompasses
structures States put into place, or actions they undertake, to
attract capital from non-state actors.9
Each mechanism of transferring capital from one country to
another enables the capital provider to impose some constraint on
the recipient government's ability to act freely. It is the rare case
when no conditions are imposed on the receipt of funds.
However, important differences exist between and within the
categories, both as to the precise nature of the constraints imposed
and more importantly, as to the ability of the recipient to
negotiate given those constraints. It is the relative ability of a
sovereign to exercise its traditional powers in the creation and
operation of each type of capital transfer agreement which has
relevance for our conceptualizations of statehood and sovereignty.
3.4. Capital Movements Involving State Actors
3.4.1. Direct Exercises of Sovereign Power
When both parties involved in a capital movement transaction
are States, the receipt of foreign capital is premised on one-on-one
negotiations between the recipient and the provider. These
negotiations may be between two States when the transfer is
bilateral. They can also be between one State and a representative
or representatives of a group of States when the transfer is
multilateral. This negotiation format enables the recipient State
to exercise its sovereign powers directly. As discussed below, this
does not mean that the recipient State will not have to accept
certain terms and conditions as the cost of receiving capital.
Rather, it permits the State to retain the fullest possible bundle of
"sticks" while making a free and conscious decision as to which
"sticks" shall pass.
14 Among others, this group includes trade arrangements, such as the
GATT and the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), international currency
exchange systems, such as those facilitated by the IMF and Organization for
Economic Co-operative Development ("OECD"), and bi- and multilateral aid
programs, including those administered by the World Bank.
" Included in this category are regulations governing for ign direct




STA TEHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY
3.4.1.1. Similarities Between Bi- and Multi-Lateral
Capital Transfers
This Article categorizes both bilateral and multilateral private
fund flows as those transfers in which the recipient State may
exercise direct power, because the recipient's role in each of the
bi- and multilateral processes are the same. When the capital
provider is another State, the process represents the paradigm of
a state-centric international system. Individual States, each
representing their particular interests, meet and conduct the steps
necessary to structure their international affairs. The individual
State thus retains its primacy. However, capital is often provided
not directly from one State to another, but through the mecha-
nism of an international organization. Therefore, the nature and
role of these institutions must be examined to determine where
and how they fit into our evolving model.
3.4.1.2. Overview of a Representative International
Financial Institution
Although many different international financial institutions
( IFIs") exist, their fundamental structures are similar. 6 IFIs are
groupings of States formed to further the members' interests by
pooling their resources. The decision to join an IFI by practical
necessity involves some passage of sovereign "sticks." States
determine whether to engage in such a passage based on a cost-
benefit analysis of power and authority ceded as the "price" of
membership, as compared to the power and rights gained through
belonging to the IFI. A brief overview of the costs of member-
ship to States and the benefits that accrue with such status is
provided in the following overview of the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), one of the most important IFIs.
The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, attended by the
world's major economic powers at that time, was the birthplace
of the IMF. Together with the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development ("World Bank") and the GATT, the
96 See, e.g., IMF Articles, supra note 51, art. XII, 1947 U.N.T.S. at 78;
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, May 29, 1990, 29 IL.M. 1077 (entered into force Mar. 28, 1991); Articles
of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan. 26, 1960, 11
U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 (entered into force Sept. 24, 1960).
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IMF oversees and facilitates economic cooperation and provides
international financing. The IMF's "core mission" was stabiliza-
tion of the international monetary system.97 The "cost" of
membership in the IMF includes a tangible payment of a subscrip-
tion or quota and an intangible ceding of sovereign power
through acquiescence to the obligations imposed on all mem-
bers. 9
These obligations include a commitment by each member State
to "direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective
of fostering orderly economic growth."'" This may not seem
to place any undue demands on any one State, as every State
could be expected to articulate its policy goals in a similar fashion.
A critical point, however, is that for IMF members, it is the IMF
rather than the State itself which defines what constitutes "orderly
economic growth."
For example, a State may believe that altering its exchange rate
would make its exports more attractive on the world market and
thereby encourage economic growth. However, if the State is a
member of the IMF, its ability to freely alter the exchange rate
will be constrained by its agreement to "avoid manipulating
exchange rates . . . to gain an unfair competitive advantage over
other members."10 ' If the State acts in a way which the IMF
believes violates this pledge, the IMF may declare the State
ineligible to use the IMF's general resources.'0 2 The power of
the DO to sit in judgment over a State's economic policy is just
one example of a stick passing or a cost incurred as a condition of
membership.
Benefits of membership in the IMF are both direct and
indirect. Directly, a member State gains the right to call on IMF
resources under its tranche policies and other special facilities.' 3
" Since the 1970s and the abandonment of the par value system, exchange
rate management has been the JMF's primary goal. See BRETTON WOODS
COMMisSION, BRETTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE A-3 (1994).
9 See IMF Articles, supra note 51, art. I[, 5 1.
99 See id. art. IV.
100 Id. art. IV, S 1(i).
101 Id. art. IV, 5 1 (iii).
102 See id. art. V, S 5.
103 The Fund's tranche policies permit members to withdraw their quota
subscriptions as needed in four tranches. The first is provided as of right, the




The precise terms under which funds will be distributed varies
depending on what is sought and who is making the request.1
°4
In all cases, however, the minimum precondition for access to
IIMF funds is membership.05
Indirectly, members benefit to the extent that the IF fulfills
its primary objectives of promoting international monetary
cooperation, facilitating trade, and lessening the duration and
degree of disequilibrium in the international balance of payments
of members." While non-members may also share these
indirect benefits by free-riding, this does not diminish their
positive effect on members. Another indirect benefit of member-
ship is the status that membership confers on a State: to be
considered a full participant in the international arena, member-
ship in the IMF is essential.
This combination of increased status and tangible financial
benefits outweighs the attendant costs of membership, thereby
explaining the near universal desire to join IFIs. 7  It is clear
that the decision to join an IFI (or for that matter any internation-
al organization) involves the passage of some "sticks" of sovereign
power and therefore is one step removed from the pure state-
centric model. However, it is only a small step. The members of
IFIs are States; therefore the basic premise that States are the
primary actors is retained, as the States act collectively.
3.4.1.2.1. Differences Between Bi- and Multilateral
Transfers
Whether acting individually or collectively, States that provide
capital often place conditions on access to their resources. In
many ways, the identity of the provider of capital is not an
Repayment of amounts borrowed is expected within three to five years. See id.
art. V., S 1-8.
104 Special facilities for member borrowing include the Extended Fund
Facility, which provides greater amounts for longer durations than the tranches,
and other special facilities designed to meet particular needs. See JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIc RELATIONS 1026-28 (3d ed.
1995) (giving an overview of the funding mechanisms).
105 See IMF Articles, supra note 51, art. V.
106 See id. art. I.
107 Of course, the cynic will note that the costs of membership may be
significantly lower in practice than in theory because States may simply ignore
Fund directives.
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important factor in considering the allocation of sovereign
"sticks." There are some differences, however, which should be
identified. By attaching conditions to the receipt of funds (i.e.
conditioning a grant of five million U.S. dollars on the maintain-
ance of an inflation rate of eight percent or lower), the provider
requires the passage of sovereign power. The precise nature of the
"sticks" passed by the recipient will obviously depend on the
extent of conditionality: the more restrictive the conditions
imposed, the greater the degree of power ceded. The identity of
the donor as bi- or multilateral makes a difference because of its
relative ability to impose conditions.
The primary difference between the conditionality imposed by
bilateral and multilateral donors is what criteria they may consider
in making an aid determination. Multilateral donors frequently
may not, either explicitly or implicitly, assess particular factors.
For instance, according to its charter documents, the World Bank
must base aid decisions on economic criteria and must ignore
political and social conditions in recipient countries.0 8 The ivIF
oversees only economic policies and must "respect the domestic
social and political policies of members." 109 Thus, for instance,
the aid may depend on the maintenance of a non-inflationary
interest rate, but not on the the removal of restrictions on the
press.
These restrictions on IFI conditionality (which serve to
encourage membership) prevent the passage of some sovereign
"sticks." In theory, the recipient of funds from these lenders does
not pass "sticks" relating to such issues as human rights conditions
or the ability to exercise civil rights. How much difference exists
in practice is subject to debate, but under our model, the identity
of the donor affects which "sticks" a donee may pass.
When aid is given in a bilateral context, these constraints are
not applicable. For example, the United States will consider such
issues as the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of self-sustain-
ing economic growth, and the encouragement of individual civil
108 See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, July 22, 1944, art. IV, S 10, 60 Stat. 1440, 1445 (entered into
force Dec. 27, 1945).
109 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for
signature Dec. 31, 1945, art. IV, S 3(b), 60 Stat. 1401, 1404.
[Vol. 18:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss3/2
STA TEHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY
and economic rights when making development aid decisions. °
Because the fund-providing State acts solely on its own behalf, it
may demand as many "sticks" from the recipient State as it
chooses.
3.4.1.2.2. Commonality in Transfers
Although the number and nature of the "sticks" passed will
vary depending on the identity of the donor, all conditionality
placed on private fund transfers requires some allocation of
sovereign attributes. This reallocation comports with a model
where the "exercise" elements of sovereignty may be shared and
therefore, is one step removed from the state-centric, traditional
model. However, this scheme remains close to the traditional
model in several important ways.
First, when the donor is another State as in the bilateral
context, the transaction fits in the traditional model of state-to-
state relations. When the donor is a grouping of States, the model
is not very different, as discussed above. Further, the receipt of
funds or other resources from a State, or coalitions of States,
typically involves an ongoing process of negotiation. Terms and
conditions are openly discussed and the recipient State plays an
active role in the process, even if it ultimately must accept what
it views as unfavorable conditions. The active, open participation
of the State enables it to retain some part of the sovereign power
of autonomy, as it (in theory) chooses voluntarily whether to
accept the conditions imposed and works to affect what those
conditions may be in the first instance.
If resources were provided to States only through the above
described types of transfers, our model of international law would
need to incorporate the notion of the passage of sovereign
"sticks." Yet simultaneously, the model could remain essentially
state-centric, a model in which States exercise directly their
powers through an open negotiation process that involves other
States, individually or collectively. Of course, these types of
transfers are not exclusive; many other avenues for providing
resources exist and must be evaluated for their impact on the
traditional model.
110 See 22 U.S.C. S 2151(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
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3.4.2. Capital Movements Involving Non-State Actors:
Indirect Exercises of Sovereign Power
The direct exercise of sovereign authority possible in bi- and
multilateral fund transfers decreases in varying degrees when the
funds flowing to the recipient come not directly from other States
or state groupings, but from private actors. Common forms of
this type of capital movement are direct foreign investment and
portfolio investment.111 The recipient State continues to play an
important role in the transfer process, but the mechanisms
through which it exercises its power differ.
3.5. Direct Foreign Investment
Direct foreign investment typically occurs when a foreign
investor gains a measure of direct control of an entity through
ownership of assets or the control of a majority of outstanding
stock. 12  The quest to attract direct foreign investment may
involve a State in a one-on-one negotiating process. This format
is similar to that in which it engages in the bi- and multilateral
transfer context, if the State is the owner of the asset in which the
foreigner seeks to invest. Even where this occurs, an important
difference between the two situations is that the co-negotiator is
likely to be a non-State. 3 The involvement of a non-state actor
requires taking a step away from the pure state-centric model.
Often, direct foreign investment will directly involve not one,
but two non-state actors. This results when the recipient State is
not the owner of the assets being invested in. In that situation,
it is reasonable to ask why one should have any concern over the
role of the State and its ability to keep its sovereign "sticks": it
is not a participant in the process. However, that position
... Funds may also flow from private charitable groups, but that process is
not relevant to this discussion as such groups typically do not overtly seek
receipt of exercise elements. For example, the Red Cross and other humanitari-
an donor agencies provide funds withlittle or no conditionality. See generally
Kueck, supra note 72, at 354-55 (discussing the international legal status of the
Red Cross).
112 See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis
of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L
L.. 529, 532 n.6 (1995).
113 If the recipient State owns the asset and the investing entity is a State,
the transaction could belong in the bilateral transfer category.
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severely misstates the State's role in the direct foreign investment
process.
While a State may not actively participate in a negotiation for
direct foreign investment, it plays an essential, albeit indirect, role
in that process. The State must craft legal regulations governing
this type of investment so that potential investors can assess costs
accurately. In this role, States walk a fine line. On one hand,
States want to draft regulations favorable to foreign investors
because of the constant need for capital and resources. On the
other hand, because direct foreign investment involves giving
equity control over assets situated in the State to foreigners, States
typically seek to exercise some control over the extent and nature
of ownership permitted.
The nature of the constraints imposed depends in large degree
on the level of development of the economy of the recipient
country. Regulatory constraints common in more developed
economies include outright bans or strict percentage restrictions
on foreign ownership of certain types of industries considered
critical to national security."1 Restrictions applied in countries
with less developed economies include bans on the entry of
foreign investment, limitations on the ability to repatriate profits
from the enterprise, and requirements that the foreign investor
have local partners.1 ' Regardless of the precise constraints, the
ability to impose them is a clear exercise of sovereign power.
This power to take unilateral action in creating regulations
governing direct foreign investment seems like a fuller exercise of
sovereign authority than is utilized in multi- or bilateral fund
transfer negotiations. After all, at the time regulations are drafted,
no one else sits across the bargaining table to directly pressure the
State to take any particular action, unlike the bi- and multilateral
capital transfer scenario. Nevertheless, the search for direct
foreign investment funds is very competitive and creates what has
114 The United States, for example, limits ownership of such industries as
nuclear energy and communications. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. SS 2131, 2133(d),
2134(d) (1994); 47 U.S.C.A. S 310 (1994), amended by 47 U.S.C.A. S 310 (West
Supp. 1997).
11 See David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
305, 305 (1991) (applying game theory to the risk of expropriation by host
country governments in foreign investments).
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been termed an "investors' market.""6
Within this market, States seeking investment capital face
severe constraints on their ability to regulate. Investors who face
restrictions on equity ownership or on their ability to draw
profits realized on funds invested in the country are likely to shift
those funds to a more receptive country. Of course, not all
investments can be easily relocated, particularly those dependent
on natural resources or requiring large infrastructure investments.
The cost of compliance with a State's investment regulations will
be factored into any investment decision. The higher the costs,
the less likely investors are to place their funds in that State.
States are aware of these factors when implementing or amending
their regulations, and so face a strong incentive to decrease (or,
face a limit on their ability to impose) burdensome regula-
tions.1
The nature of this diminution of a State's ability to act freely
is significantly different than that facing a State engaged in bi- and
multilateral transfer agreements. Regulations governing foreign
direct investment are not typically drafted as part of a negotiating
116 This competition affects both the initial ability to attract investment
capital to a State and the ability to retain funds in the State, or to preclude
"capital flight." ASIL 1994 Report, supra note 11, at 447 (comments of
Professor Franck).
11 See generally RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION:
THE END OF GEOGRAPHY 1 (1992) (suggesting the onset of "a state of
economic development where geographica location no longer matters in
finance"); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: Who Should Be a
Country's Lender of Last Resort?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1769, 1777 (1995)
(discussing the need for a "rethinking of the multilateral response to exchange
crises in [newly industrialized] countries"); Peter Behr, The IMF's Hard Line on
Russiv Agency Refuses to Back Off on Economic Reform Demands, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1994, at F1 (describing tension between Russia and the IMF); Lee Hock-
stader, IMF Delays Loan Payment to Moscow Due to Compliance Concerns,
WASH. POST, July 24, 1996, at A24 (reporting the IMF's postponement of
monthly payments to the Russian government due to a "sharp fall in Moscow's
revenue from tax receipts"); Tod Robberson, Venezuela, Once Oil-Wealthy, Now
Seeks International Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1995, at A20 (describing
Venezuela's request for emergency loans from the IMF).
The degree of the constraint, of course, depends on the other factors in the
investment decision equation. States that offer investors extremely attractive
markets are therefore less likely to cede power to potential investors. A prime
example is China, which refuses to alter control policies to win investment
despite considerable external pressure. See generally Henry J. Graham, Foreign
Investment Laws of China and the United States, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
253 (1996) (exploring the difficulties of the emerging Chinese foreign




process with potential investors. Indeed, a State may never
acknowledge explicitly that it is factoring foreign investors'
interests into its regulatory decisionmaking process. This, on the
surface, comports with a state-centric model. However, some
critical considerations lurk beneath that surface. States are not
free in any real sense in today's investment climate to impose
whichever regulations they desire. If they need funds (and they
often do), the necessity constrains their regulatory discretion.
Thus, some "sticks" are reallocated from the State to the providers
of foreign direct investment funds.
This indirect reallocation of control calls for a view of
sovereign "sticks" as distributable, as in the earlier examples. It
also demands recognition of non-traditional actors as legitimate
recipients of those "sticks." Thus, we must move further away
from a pure state-centric model. While there is some recognition
of this shift in specific instances, its impact on the broader
structure of international law has not been articulated. This may
be due in part to the indirect nature of the shift which makes it
more difficult to pin down. An inherent unwillingness to
recognize the growing importance of non-state actors may also
contribute to this difficulty. The danger in failing to acknowledge
this change is highlighted in the context of portfolio investment
where money managers who receive many sovereign "sticks" are
routinely not acknowledged.
4. SPECIFIC OPERATION OF THE "BUNDLED" MODEL
4.1. Portfolio Investment
Portfolio investment for purposes of this article refers to
private investment in a State's capital markets by foreigners.
While once considered an incidental source of funds, many States
now depend on the attraction and retention of portfolio invest-
ment for their economic well-being. The numbers clearly reveal
the growing importance of this source of financing. Portfolio
investment in emerging markets increased by almost $30 million
U.S. in one decade: from $5.6 million in 1985 to $33.7 million in
1995. During the same time period, although official development
funds to the same countries increased from $37 million to $64
million, official funds constituted only 27.8% of aggregate net
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
resource flows in 1995 as compared to 53.2% in 1985.118
As a result of the disparity in rates of increase, private
investments (as opposed to official funds) now account for three-
quarters of all financial flows. Within the private funds category,
it is portfolio investment funds which dominate."" The bottom
line of these shifting trends in investment profiles is that portfolio
investment is increasing in both actual and comparative magni-
tude. The managers of portfolio investment now control vast
resources whose value cannot be overstated: in 1994, pension
funds held securities valued in excess of $2 trillion while mutual
funds held $800 billion in securities.12 ° It is essential to a proper
understanding of statehood and sovereignty that the model reflect
the role played by those in control of these resources.
On one level, portfolio investment may not seem to implicate
sovereignty issues at all: a portfolio manager choosing to buy
stock on a particular State's exchange is simply participating in a
free market where that State may not appear as an active play-
er. 21 If all the process involved was an entity joining the
market as a potential seller and another entity accessing that
market as a purchaser, there would be little need for discussion.
However, as with direct foreign investment, the process entails
much more. The role of a State in regulating, promoting and
participating in its capital markets cannot be ignored.
The nature of this role and its implications for statehood and
sovereignty must be considered in several contexts. First, there is
a growing movement that advocates international regulation of the
capital market." If proponents of this approach prevail, new
"I See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, EMERGING STOCK
MARKETS FACTBOOK 6 (1996) [hereinafter FACTBOOK].
19 Private non-portfolio fund transfers increased only 4% in 1994 as
compared to 61% in 1993. See id. at 5.
120 See id. at 6; see generally Maura B. Perry, Note, A Challenge Postponed.-
Market 2000 Complacency in Response to Regulatory Competition for International
Equity Markets, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 701 (1994) (discussing the removal of barriers
to equity market mobility).
121 Of course, if the State owns the entity that is selling or purchasing the
stock, the State will act as a market participant rather than as a controlling
State.
122 See generally ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, SUPERVISING INTERNATIONAL
BANKS: ORIGINS AND IMPICATIONS OF THE BASLE ACCORD 1-9 (Peter B.
Kenen et al. eds., Essays in Int'l Fin. No. 185, 1991) (analyzing the implications
of the Basle Accord for the international financial system); Peter E. Millspaugh,




actors will be created either as new free-standing regulatory bodies
or as new groups within existing entities. This addition of actors
will require expansion of the cast of international players
recognized as eligible recipients of sovereign "sticks." Because the
new actors fit neatly into the same roles as existing international
organizations such as IFIs, this expansion need not radically alter
the traditional model. Once the idea that "sticks" can be passed
is accepted, the identity of the new actor is not problematic.
Because there is no immediate likelihood of the creation of an
international regulatory body, a more difficult issue is how States
should allocate their sovereign "sticks" in the absence of interna-
tional regulation. What role does the recipient State play in
attracting portfolio investment?
Theoretically, States are free to structure their capital markets
as they see fit in a free, full exercise of their sovereign autonomy.
However, as the competition for foreign funds increases, market
forces move States to create and maintain economic conditions
that will entice investors. Just as the need for foreign direct
investment prohibits an unfettered exercise of power by the State
in drafting regulations, so too does the fierce competition for
portfolio funds significantly constrain a State's ability to design
and modify its economic policies. If those controlling portfolio
investment view economic policies as "disfavorable," they will
direct that investment elsewhere. These constraints pose serious
challenges to a state-centric model for several reasons. First, they
have the potential to cause large reallocations of sovereign "sticks";
second, the identity of the other actors involved in the realloca-
tion of power forces recognition of non-state, nontraditional
entities; and third, the manner in which the reallocation occurs is
such that States may not admit openly that it occurs, permitting
the effectuation of hidden shifts.
4.2. Magnitude of Constraints
To appreciate the magnitude of constraints placed upon States
seeking portfolio investment, a cursory understanding of the
mechanisms and motivations of that investment process is
required. Investors engage in portfolio investment because it
L. & EcoN. 355 (1992) (reviewing the functioning of the new global
marketplace); Perry, supra note 120, at 73847 (considering the SEC's response
to equity market internationalization).
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enables diversification, which in turn helps achieve maximum
returns.' 3 Portfolio investment may take place in several forms,
but the most important are investments in debt or in equity.
Debt investment typically involves purchases of bonds issued by
States. States rely on an international market to meet their
borrowing requirements and to finance budget deficits, while
purchasers diversify their portfolios by holding a wide spectrum
of bonds. 24
The international bond market is becoming increasingly
important from both the issuer and purchaser perspective.
121
Portfolio investment in debt instruments is quite different from
the traditional debtor/creditor relationship. Bonds purchased on
the open market are usually freely tradable and do not engender
the same concerns for purchasers as straight loans do. For
example, if a bond purchaser becomes dissatisfied with market
conditions for any particular bond, it simply sells that bond, an
exit option not readily available to a traditional creditor.
Equity investment in its simplest form involves purchases of
securities, which represent an ownership interest in the underlying
entity. International equity investment experienced a revival in
the 1980s which continues today. Its popularity stems from
increased demand for equity by large investors looking to place
huge pools of money in the market and from the creation of new
sources of equity through privatization.
126
While a portfolio need not contain international stocks or
bonds, international portfolios are now commonplace due to the
increasing importance and accessibility of foreign markets.'V
123 See, e.g., Greg Steinmetz, Too Close to Home: Buying the Stock of a U.S.
Multinational Company Is No Way to Go Global, WALL ST. J., June 27, 1996,
at R11 (arguing that American multinational corporations are not the best
"building blocks" for an international investment portfolio).
124 See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE: FORCES SHAPING THE
REVOLUTION IN BANKING, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL MARKETS 34-35
(1995) (giving an overview of international bond markets) [hereinafter OECD
DOCUMENTS].
125 One piece of evidence of the importance of the international bond
market is the increase in issuances over the past fifteen years. In 1981, the
nominal value of publicly issued bonds was approximately $37 billion U.S. By
1993, that figure had increased to over $160 billion U.S. See id.
126 See id. at 35.
127 See generally FACTBOOK, supra note 118, at 8 (stating that "market




These funds are significant. Spurred by technological advances
and a relaxation of governmental control over capital flows,
portfolio investment funds are enormous and are gaining in
comparison to other types of investment.1 28 Huge sums of money
are now being directed to capital markets worldwide.
The vast dollar figures involved in portfolio investment
through the well-known "power of the purse" give money
managers a significant voice on the international stage. As
discussed further below, the emergence of such actors is causing
a reallocation of some "sticks" of sovereign power. The magni-
tude of the shift is amplified by an important distinguishing
feature of portfolio investment - its liquidity.
The more liquid an investment is, the more readily it can be
withdrawn from a State in favor of an alternative investment site.
The more liquid an investment is, the greater is the possibility
that those controlling the investment will immediately withdraw
funds if an unfavorable investment climate (from the investor's
perspective) arises. This possibility, coupled with a dependance on
portfolio investment, limits the free action of state policy makers.
Thus, the more liquid the investment is, the greater the number
of "sticks" held by the capital provider becomes,
Of the several investment vehicles discussed, portfolio
investment is by far the most liquid. In general, official aid,
whether bi- or multilateral, cannot suddenly be withdrawn either
because it is given pursuant to a binding agreement or because it
would be ill-advised politically to do so. Direct foreign invest-
ment is also not quickly withdrawn. When an investment
involves significant control, as in the case of direct foreign
investment, the investor becomes a stake-holder in the project. If
unfavorable conditions arise, it is in the investor's interest to
remain in the recipient State and to attempt to remedy the
problems. Otherwise, the investor risks pulling out and forfeiting
its control and the start-up costs of its investment. Commercial
bank loans also pose a relatively low level of risk of withdrawal.
The only way creditors recoup their investment is from repay-
exist a year ago continued to open and expand").
121 For example, between 1977-81, 67% of Latin America's external
financing came from commercial banks. By 1992, this percentage fell to 14%,
while portfolio investment grew from 15% in the late 1970s to 40% by the
early 1990s. See Moises Naim, Mexico's Larger Story, 1995 FOREIGN POL'Y 112,
122.
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ment of the loan. If a loan recipient encounters difficulty in
meeting payment obligations, it is likely that the creditor will
work to renegotiate loan terms. Renegotiation would be
preferable to putting the debtor in a default position where the
creditor receives nothing.129
Portfolio investment managers do not share the concerns of
long-term investors or creditors, and do not have similar incen-
tives to keep their capital in any particular State. With on-line
data and high technology information monitoring systems readily
available, portfolio managers can easily keep abreast of interna-
tional market conditions. If a manager with funds invested in a
State finds a higher rate of return available elsewhere, or if the
conditions in the host State look risky for any reason, portfolio
managers can and often do quickly remove their funds. With
enormous resources at their disposal, and with the ability to move
these resources at the push of a button, money managers can be
and are extremely demanding when allocating their funds.
Often, portfolio managers will not consider a State as an
investment site unless certain economic conditions exist there -
conditions which enable the manager to maximize returns.
Managers also hold the hammer of fund withdrawal over the
heads of state policy makers. 30 The policies affected by the
need to compete for investment dollars, including fiscal, monetary
and social policies, are central to state function. The ability of
managers to indirectly mandate conditions for investment
highlights the degree to which a State reallocates some of its
sovereign "sticks" in the search for portfolio investment.
In assessing potential investment sites, international portfolio
managers look for host States with liberal policies regarding
repatriation of investments and earnings coupled with unrestrict-
ed, easily available currency exchange. 3' Gains derived from
foreign markets are clearly of little use if they can not be brought
home readily. Additionally, foreign investors favor States that
maintain a deflationary (or at least a non-inflationary) macroeco-
nomic policy. If inflation rises beyond ordinary expectations, the
129 While the debt obligations may be transferable, some creditor retains a
stake in the State's well-being.
130 See generally Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 92.
131 See OECD DOCUMENTS, supra note 124, at 35 (noting that in
attempting to attract foreign investment "governments deregulate& domestic
markets and abolished exchange controls").
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relative value of foreign investment in that State will decline and
investors will shy away.1 2 The need to follow non-inflationary
policies may require a State to adopt strategies it otherwise might
prefer to avoid in an effort to attract foreign investors. Such
policies include maintainance of higher interest rates or reducing
social programs and other support to citizens in order to reduce
deficit levels.133
Thus, the need for portfolio investment may dictate to a State
that it follow economic policies with troubling social consequenc-
es, including increased unemployment and other social ills.
34
The hope, of course, is that these policies will be to the State's
advantage in the long run. Whether or not this is true, it is
important to note the reallocation of sovereign "sticks" which has
occurred. States have transferred "sticks" not only to non-States,
but also to unrecognized actors.
4.3. Mechanics of Reallocation with Regard to Portfolio
Investment
The mechanism of passing sovereign "sticks" involved with
portfolio investment differs significantly from other fund transfer
schemes. With bi- and multilateral fund transfers, the demands of
a known actor - usually another State or an entity comprised of
States - limit a State's policy choices. While bargaining power
may be constrained in these situations, they fit within the state-
centric model because they permit negotiation between state
actors. When the funds flow through direct foreign investment,
non-States may be involved, but the participants are readily
identifiable.
132 To oversimplify for the purpose of example: if $100 U.S. are invested
in Mexico when the peso is worth $1 U.S., the value of the investment is $100
U.S. If the value of the peso increases due to inflation so that $1 U.S. now
buys only half a peso, the overall value of the initial investment falls.
13 See Grabel, supra note 18, at 8 (noting that limitations on policy
autonomy may "necessitate the pursuit of restrictive macroeconomic and social
policy, to the detriment of economically vulnerable groups").
134 See, e.g., Jonathan Friedland, Latin America Resists Reform Backlash,
WAL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1996, at A15 (recognizing that portfolio investors force
countries to implement policies leading to high unemployment, stagnant
salaries, and poverty).
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Although market forces limit the ability of a State to place
restrictions on direct foreign investors, the recipient State retains
some ability to regulate its behavior due to the foreign investors'
long-term interests in the State and to their identifiability. If a
direct foreign investor becomes unhappy with conditions in the
recipient State, it cannot withdraw instantly. Instead, there is a
window of time in which the State and the investor can negotiate.
Thus, while the State cedes more "sticks" through this investment
structure than it does in the bi- and multilateral context, it retains
the ability to deal openly and directly with investors in the final
instance.
To a large degree, that ability disappears when a State allocates
some of its "sticks" to disparate and unrecognized market forces
governing portfolio investment. Portfolio managers have no long-
term stake in the country and operate behind the scenes. States
know of their demands, but have no established avenue in the
current international model to directly address these partici-
pants. 35 Thus, a State requiring portfolio funds must deal with
entities that are not accommodated in the current international
model but who are able, through their control over economic
resources, to cause a significant passing of "sticks." The ability of
this group to stay one step removed from the traditional interna-
tional structure and to operate outside the state-centric model, has,
to date, prevented wide recognition of the centrality of their role.
States are then left to shadow-box with these actors. Whether
these actors are positive or negative additions, they are additions.
Acknowledging this is a step towards understanding the parameter
within which States now act.
Portfolio managers are now de facto in possession of some
"sticks" of sovereignty. Recipient States cede some degree of
autonomy to these managers. A State, of course, could retain its
full autonomy by ignoring the demands of portfolio investors and
implementing policies contradictory to their wishes. However,
135 There is some suggestion that, at times, money managers do exert direct
influence on state policy makers. For example, "[m]utual funds have not only
displaced the Bretton Woods institutions as the main providers of money to
developing countries, but they are also offering 'advice' to officials of the very
countries in which they are often the largest foreign investors." Naim, supra
note 128, at 123. If this is true and demonstrable, it would support the notion
that these managers should receive recognition on the international stage where
they already clearly play an important role.
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this approach could have dire economic consequences for the
State. If a State depends on portfolio investment for funds (and
virtually every State does to varying degrees), the appearance of
unfettered state choice in the ability to forego these funds is
illusory. It may also be true that the conditions considered
essential by portfolio investors dovetail precisely with what the
State would seek to achieve absent such demands. That happy
circumstance does not erase the power money managers possess.
It simply masks the loss of autonomy experienced by the State
until the needs of the State and the demands of the investors
diverge. It remains true that, through their control over the
market for funds, portfolio managers are exerting more and more
influence over matters traditionally viewed as solely within the
province of States.
Despite the increasing reallocation of sovereign "sticks" caused
by the emergence of new actors, the legal community does not yet
broadly recognize portfolio managers as meaningful players. The
failure of legal scholars to pay attention to these actors may be
due, in part, to their non-state status. Non-state actors have
historically proved difficult for international legal scholars to
include in their framework. This problem is evidenced by the
inability of the international legal community to deal effectively
with the emergence of multinational corporations as a powerful
presence on the international stage.13 The inability or unwill-
ingness to recognize the power wielded by non-state actors has
serious consequences. If their power remains unacknowledged,
and hence not accommodated in a legal framework, we may have
recurrent economic crises in the world economy. If that sounds
dramatic, consider the example of the Mexican Peso Crisis of
1994-95. 37
"' Although the power of these entities is widely acknowledged (unlike
that of portfolio managers), attempts to regulate them on the international level
have been unsuccessful. See UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN WORLD DEVELOP-
MENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/89, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.ll.A.15 (1988); see generally Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations
and International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between
International Legal Cooperation and Economic Development, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 1275 (1995) (discussing the United Nations' attempts to draft
codes).
137 One commentator terms the Peso Crisis a "financial earthquake" which
revealed the dangerous "fault lines underlying current trends in global
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
5. THE MEXICAN PESO CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF THE
"BUNDLED" MODEL
The "Mexican Peso Crisis" of 1994-95 demonstrates clearly
both the expanding role of non-state actors and the inability of
existing legal structures to address adequately their presence on the
international stage. While not all assertions of power by these
actors will have negative effects, the Peso Crisis shows how these
assertions may severely limit a State's choice of policies. This
limitation has direct consequences for the State in question, as
well as broader implications for the global community.
5.1. The "Crisis"
The term "Mexican Peso Crisis" refers to the chain of events
which began on December 20, 1994, when the Mexican peso was
devalued by approximately 15% and then fell over the next few
months to a level less than half its pre-devaluation rate. 38 The
devaluation of the peso was the culmination of numerous
pressures on Mexican financial markets. The country plunged
into economic distress, as portfolio investment funds which had
enabled Mexico to prop up the peso's value were quickly pulled
out of the country.139 The situation in Mexico did not stabilize
until the United States and other lenders stepped in with an
unprecedented assistance package totaling over fifty billion U.S.
dollars. 4°  However, before this assistance could be made
available, other capital markets experienced contagion effects1 41
economics and politics." Naim, supra note 128, at 112.
138 See ]IMF 1996 REPORT, supra note 19, at 53.
139 The World Bank estimated that in the weeks following the devaluation,
portfolio investments in Mexico fell from $8 billion to less than $1 billion. See
Vincent J. Schodolski, Funds Wired Wallets Cause Shock Waves In, Beyond
Emerging Markets Mexico Crisis Highlights the Hazards of "Hot Money," CI.
TRIB., Feb. 26, 1995, at 1.
140 See id.
141 The "contagion effect" is the natural reaction of market participants
confronting negative economic trends in one market to ask "if it could happen
in Country X, why won't it also happen in Countries Y or Z?" See IMF 1996
REPORT, supra note 19, at 113 (discussing severe effects of Mexican Peso Crisis
on Argentina); see also Vittorio Corbo & Leonardo Hernandez, Macroeconomic
Adjustment to Capital Inflows: Lessons from Recent Latin American and East
Asian Experience, 11 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERvER 61, 63 (1996) (referring to




and governments worldwide, particularly the United States,
confronted serious legal and economic concerns with regard to the
ability and necessity of providing aid. 42
5.2. Roots of The Crisis
Ironically, the troubles in Mexico in the mid-1990's belie the
old adage "nothing succeeds like success." Following the debt
crisis of 1982, when Mexico led a host of Latin American debtors
in announcing that it could not service its external debt, Mexican
authorities undertook numerous economic reforms to regain
legitimacy in the international community. These reforms
included a deficit reduction program, wage and price controls,
privatization of state enterprises, and the establishment of a
"crawling peg" exchange rate which linked the value of the peso
to the U.S. dollar.1 43 One result of the combined impact of
these measures was a dramatic reduction in the country's inflation
rate from 180% in 1987 to 8% in 1994.' In addition, Mexico
sought to liberalize its international trade regime and to increase
direct foreign investment in the country. A strong signal of
Mexico's success in these efforts came with its entry into the
GATT and NAFTA.145
The seemingly improved economic climate of favorable
inflation rates, strong trade potential and strengthening direct
foreign investment, coupled with "dull gains on U.S. stocks...
and low yields on U.S. bonds,"146 encouraged portfolio investor
interest. The Mexican capital markets became a popular site for
142 See John H. Chun, Note, "Post-Modern" Sovereign Debt Crisis: Did
Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647,
2648 (1996) (noting that the dissent in Congress stalled the aid package for
Mexico); Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight:
Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout, 105
YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (1996) (mentioning that "a significant number of Senators
and Re presentatives... questioned [the] legality" of the aid plan for Mexico);
Humphrey, supra note 14, at 200 (noting that some Congressmen opposed the
stabilization plan for the Mexican Peso Crisis).
143 This type of exchange rate system created a band within which the peso
moved in relation to movements in the value of the dollar. See Naim, supra
note 128, at 116.
144 See Ramon Moreno, Mexico and the Peso, FRSBSF Weekly Letter (Fed.
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Mar. 29, 1995).
"4 See GATT, supra note 35; NAFTA, supra note 35.
146 Petruno, supra note 91, at A26.
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international money managers seeking to diversify their portfolios
worldwide. Together with the general increase of international
capital flows to developing countries, the result was that Mexico
received $28 billion U.S. dollars in net portfolio flows in
1993.147
Unfortunately, these external trappings of improved economic
health masked several important dangers threatening the Mexican
economy. The precise causes of the Peso Crisis are complex and
more technical than this Article can easily explain. To state the
situation somewhat simplistically, the Mexican government in
effect became dependent on the large and growing inflow of
portfolio investment. The presence of large amounts of foreign
capital enabled the government to artificially inflate the value of
the peso and to avoid confronting signals of the serious overvalu-
ation of the currency.
This dependency set up a vicious cycle. Although Mexico
relied on foreign investment for its economic survival, it had to
follow destructive economic policies in order to attract that
investment. These policies consisted of both insuring investors
against currency exchange losses on five billion dollars of peso
denominated debt instruments if the peso dropped below a
prescribed range, and increasing central-bank peso purchases.
1 48
So long as the Mexican markets remained an attractive investment
site, the policies would be tolerable. Unfortunately, however,
their appeal diminished quickly.
Economic policies at home and abroad combined with political
upheaval in Mexico to reduce the appeal of Mexican markets to
foreign investors. Originally, those economic policies which
contributed greatly to the Mexican Peso Crisis were adopted to
enhance Mexico's international stature. A particularly problemat-
ic policy was the crawling pegged exchange rate. Linking the
Mexican peso to the U.S. dollar assured cheap imports and helped
keep inflation in check in Mexico. 149 However, it permitted the
peso to appear artificially strong; its value failed to reflect the true
' See Mexico's Economic Situation and U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Peso:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 67 (1995)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
148 See Craig Torres & Dianne Solis, Two Mexican Banks Discuss Combina-
tion, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994, at A10.
149 See Magda Kornis, Financial Crisis in Mexico, MEXIco TRADE & L.
REP., Feb. 1, 1995.
[Vol. 18:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss3/2
STA TEHOOD AND SOVEREIGNTY
status of Mexico's domestic purchasing power or its current
payments account.'5°
While these economic policies were initially successful in
attracting foreign investment to the Mexican markets, events on
the ground began to make Mexico a less attractive prospect. On
January 1, 1994, an uprising in Chiapas by the Zapatist National
Liberation Army in protest of Mexico's social and political
conditions sparked a long-running conflict."' Numerous acts of
violence ensued, including the assassinations of presidential
candidate Luis Colosio in March and of the Secretary General of
the PRI (Mexico's ruling party) in September. 2 These difficul-
ties cast a pall over the Mexican markets because political
instability is a risk factor seriously considered by foreign inves-
tors.5 3 As the political situation worsened and investors began
expressing concerns, the government took steps to bolster investor
confidence by aggressively defending the peso in foreign exchange
markets, depleting its supplies of foreign reserves in the pro-
cess. 154
At the same time, the crawling pegged exchange rate system
was fundamentally undermining the health of the peso. When
inflation rates in the United States and Mexico were comparable,
this pegged rate helped stabilize the Mexican currency. However,
when the Mexican rate of inflation became higher than that of the
United States, 155 the pegged exchange rate policy prevented the
devaluation of the peso which would have otherwise occurred. As
150 See id.
151 See Douglas W. Payne, Wall Street Blues, NEW REPUBuc, Mar. 13, 1995,
at 20.
152 See id.
153 See id. (discussing how Mexican political instability caused many
investors to "get cold feet" and to move capital out of Mexico); see also Calvin
D. Siebert & Mahmood A. Zaidi, Employment, Trade and Foreign Investment
Effects of NAFTA, 5 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 353 (1996) (noting that the
Bank of Mexico's issuance of the dollar-indexed tesobonos "ma e foreign
investors even more nervous" and provided the "final straw that broke the
camel's back").
1'5 See Humphrey, supra note 14; Naim, supra note 128.
155 This occurred because, at the time, the United States was vigorously
pursuing an anti-inflation strategy. See John M. Berry, Greenspan Warns Higher
inflation May Be in Offing, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1994, at B13 (reporting that
just before the peso crisis, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan testified before
Congress as totis concern about inflation and warned that interest rates might
be raised to fend off inflation).
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a result, the peso became increasingly overvalued.156 The gover-
nment's decision to raise interest rates on its short term treasury
bills exacerbated dangers posed by Mexico's pegged exchange rate
system. The same is true of the government's move to increase
the issuance of tesobonos, treasury notes indexed to U.S. dollars,
as "suggested" by Weston Group, an investment bank representing
such institutional investors as Fidelity Investments and Solomon
Brothers, among others.5 7
This move away from peso-denominated cetes to tesobonos was
an overt effort to retain foreign investment funds. By issuing
tesobonos, the Mexican government shifted the risk of currency
fluctuations from portfolio investors to the Mexican government
because the government based its obligation to pay on the value
of the U.S. dollar if the peso declined in value. Only by taking
this step to reduce the risk associated with investment in the
country could Mexico forestall capital flight it could not afford.
Without any direct acknowledgement of what had transpired,
Mexico lost its ability to craft its policies freely and allocated some
measure of its autonomy to the managers of foreign funds. 5 '
156 Although this is by no means intended to be an economic analysis of
the crisis, a brief explanation may clarify the basic mechanics of this phenome-
non. Suppose in a fixed exchange rate world, $1 U.S. = 2 Mexican pesos, and
that the interest rate in each country is 10%. An investor facing these options
could purchase either a $1 bond or a 2 peso bond and be indifferent between
the choices (setting aside other risk variables). If the interest rate in the U.S.
dropped to 5%, while the Mexican rate held constant, the price of the U.S.
bond would then increase because the interest rate and the price of bonds have
an inverse relationship. Now the $1 U.S. bond which was worth 2 Mexican
pesos might cost $2 U.S. to purchase, changing the currency equivalency from
1:2 to 1:1 and overvaluing the Mexican bond because the currency could not
adjust to correct the imbalance.
157 The Weston Group sent a document to Mexican officials titled "What
Will It Take to Get Capital Flowing Back to Mexico?" which included the
advice that Mexico issue more tesobonos. See David Wessel et al., Peso Surprise:
How Mexico's Crisis Ambushed Top Minds in Officialdom, Finance, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 1995, at Al, A4.
158 See generally Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 92, at 562 (asserting that
the need to attract foreign investment "forced the Mexican government to
decide whether it should raise interest rates ... or devalue the peso"); Naim,
supra note 128, at 123 (noting that the "Mexican crisis offers interesting insights
into the new role of international money managers and the conditions they
impose on the countries in which they become major investors" and that





For a time, this passage of power had no ill effect. The
conditions sought by money managers led to some short term
success as the continued presence of foreign investment enabled
the government to mask true economic conditions. Eventually,
however, the combination of economic and political pressures
bearing on Mexico caused the house of cards to tumble. As the
depletion of reserves became apparent, foreign investors became
doubtful of Mexico's ability to maintain the value of the peso,
particularly in light of large amounts soon to be due on foreign-
held tesobonos.'59 As reserve levels sank to $7 billion in Decem-
ber, 1994, President Zedillo, with no advance warning, unilaterally
broadened the band of the crawling pegged exchange rate, causing
the devaluation of the peso by 12.7%."0 One day later, on
December 21, the government entirely abandoned the pegged rate
and announced that the peso would be allowed to float.
61
The devaluation of the peso and the return to a free floating
exchange rate had severe implications for the overall health of the
Mexican economy.62 However, unlike the international reac-
tion to Mexico's 1982 debt crisis, 63 no unified program of
international assistance was rapidly forthcoming. In part, this is
attributable to the actors involved in each crisis. When Mexico
defaulted on its loans in 1982, governments and international
financial institutions worked out the problem in a fairly systemat-
ic way due to the nature of the parties involved. The primary
creditors were large commercial banks which had long-standing
interests in the region giving them incentive to negotiate, rather
than simply withdraw their commitments.1" Home govern-
ments, which wanted the loans renegotiated so as to "preserv[e]
the ally," brought additional pressure to bear on these banks.
16
159 See Naim, supra note 128, at 117-18.
160 See Craig Torres & Paul B. Carroll, Mexico Reverses Currency Policy; Peso
Falls 12.7%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1994, at A3.
161 See Chun, supra note 142, at 2658.
162 See Naim, supra note 128, at 119 (stating that by March 1995, "a quarter
of a million Mexicans had joined the ranks of the unemployed").
163 The term "debt crisis" refers to the situation in the early 1980s when
many Latin American countries experienced serious debt-servicing difficulties,
forcing renegotiation of their outstanding loans. See Rory Macmillan, The Next
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 308 (1995).
164 See id. at 321-323.
165 Lichtenstein, supra note 117, at 1774.
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Thus, when Mexico sought assistance from its creditors in 1982,
it was able to craft a wide-ranging bailout financed by a broad
spectrum of the international community "virtually over-
night."
166
With the Peso Crisis, Mexico faced a quite different situation.
Just as the power exercised by portfolio investors contributed to
the collapse of the Mexican economy, their presence - and the
inability of the international community to address it adequately
- slowed or prevented attempts to remedy the problem. The
"creditors" who underwrote the overvaluation of the currency
were not long-term stakeholders in the Mexican economy, but
profit-maximizing globetrotters who could easily move their
money to more attractive venues. Whether or not foreign
investors did pull vast sums of money out in reaction to the
crisis,167 the knowledge that such action was possible at any time
set parameters within which the state had to act. If the Mexican
government had imposed foreign exchange controls, which could
have prevented quick withdrawal of portfolio investment from the
country, it would have severely diminished the appeal of its
markets in the long run,16 and could have created a negative
global impact 69 Because of its dependence on portfolio invest-
ment both before and after the crisis, Mexico found itself in a
situation where it could not freely exercise sovereign power in
selecting policy responses to the crisis. 70 Faced with limited
166 Id. at 1771.
167 According to the popular press, foreign investors pulled their money out
in droves. See, e.g., Petruno, supra note 91, at A26 ("foreign owners of Mexican
stocks and bonds rushed to exit"); Schodolski, supra note 139 (stating that
finance officials in other countries were "nervously watching the big institution-
al investors frantically pull their money out of Mexico"). The IMF, however,
suggested a contrary view. See IMF 1996 REPORT, supra note 19, at 8
(suggesting domestic investors sparked the exodus in asserting that "much of
the peso crisis was due to the speed at which Mexican capital left the country").
168 See Lichtenstein, supra note 117, at 1775 (noting that the "new rules" of
international capital markets would not have tolerated this act of default and
that international investors would have shunned Mexico in the future).
169 See George Graham et al., Bitter Legacy of Battle to Bail out Mexico, FIN.
TMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at 4 (quoting Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of
the IMF, as stating that if Mexico had utilized foreign exchange controls, it
"would have been a true world catastrophe as the pressure on other [states] to
follow would have been tremendous").
170 This result is likely to occur more frequently as countries shift from
syndicated bank loans and toward securitized capital investments. The Mexican




options, Mexico sought international assistance funding.
The international community responded to the crisis with
varying degrees of concern. Although the IMF and the Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS") quickly pledged $7.8 billion and
$5 billion respectively, these amounts were insufficient to address
the problem."' The IMF began the process of structuring
additional credit transfers for Mexico, but those wheels turned
very slowly.'72 The North American Swap Facility ("NASF"),
which was created to supplement NAFTA, provided Mexico with
short-term funds of approximately $10 billion from the United
States and Canada, but that too proved insufficient to combat the
problem.'7 3 Other sources did not readily provide multilateral
aid. Many of the members of the international community with
the resources to help Mexico chose to treat the situation as only
a Mexican domestic problem, one for Mexico to resolve on its
own. 74 It fell to the United States, which treated the crisis as
a "global economic security issue with direct impact on the U.S.
economy," 7 5 to structure a rescue package for Mexico. 76 This
package enabled Mexico to meet its obligations to foreign
investors and maintain international confidence in its markets.
(noting that "[i]ndividual countries with significant external debt ... are
increasingly likely to suffer liquidity crises ... [as] portfolio investment
replace[s] relatively stable syndicated bank loans to developing economies")
(footnotes omitted).
171 See Graham, supra note 169, at 4.
172 See id.
173 See Kenneth H. Bacon & Craig Torres, NAFTA Partners Move to Rein
in Their Currencies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1994, at A8.
14 Countries who faced contagion risks from the Peso Crisis were
primarily other developing countries with insufficient funds to provide
meaningfi assistance. See IMF 1996 REPORT, supra note 19, at 1, 7-10.
175 SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 22 (1996).
176 The final aid package proposed for Mexico consisted of a direct loan of
approximately $50 billion, ofwhich $20 billion came from the United States,
$18 billion from the IMF (including $8 billion already promised to Mexico and
an additional $10 billion), $10 billion from the BIS, $1.5 billion from Canada,
and $3 billion from commercial banks. Of these amounts, the U.S. and RMF
portions were finalized, and the BIS portion was not. See Chun, supra note
142, at 2660-62.
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The bailout package announced by the United States consisted
of IMF, BIS and U.S. funds."7 Both the content and the process
through which the plan was structured proved extremely
controversial. IMF and BIS officials felt that the United States
had overstated the BIS's commitment to the package, announcing
that the BIS had agreed to provide funds when in fact it had only
agreed to consider the proposal.' 8 Ultimately, the IMF did
formally agree to the plan, but many members were angered that
the IMF used its resources to "bail out risk-taking American
mutual and pension fund managers," 17'9 and that the bailout set
bad lending precedent.8 0 U.S. critics of the bailout also argued
against saving the money of Wall Street investors and called for a
more inclusive multilateral approach.'' Despite these criticisms
and objections, the bailout did occur and Mexico, for the time
being, avoided more serious consequences.'
The "successful" resolution of the Mexican crisis does not
mean that the general problem of liquidity imbalances has been
solved. Indeed, financial luminaries are quick to point out that
"Mexico is not the first, and it won't be the last financial crisis
aggravated by the increasing amounts of highly mobile [short-
term] capital."" 3 On the practical level, it is clear that "[t]he
world's financial system has.., raced ahead of the institutional
infrastructure for crisis management."184
177 See id.
178 See Graham, supra note 169, at 4.
171 See Chun, supra note 142, at 2659.
180 See id.
18 See id. at 2663.
182 The risk taken by the United States in financing the bailout was
alleviated in January 1997 when Mexico repaid the final amounts due three
years ahead of schedule. See Frank James, Mexico Pays off U.S. Loan Ahead of
Schedule, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1997, at 18.
183 Mark Clayton, World's Economic Structure Shifts, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, June 28, 1995, at 1 (quoting Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank); see also Miche[ Camdessus, Address at the Council of
the Americas Conference, in STATE DEP'T BRIEFING, at 5 (May 1995) ("Vastly
increased financial flows across national borders have also ma e countries that
participate in international financial markets much more vulnerable to adverse
shifts in market sentiments.").
184 David Suratgar, The International Financial System and the Management
of the International Debt Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIAT-
ING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 493, 495




6. RESPONSES TO THE CHANGING REALITY
Not only have changes in the world's financial system
outpaced changes in institutional infrastructure, they have
occurred without thoughtful attention from the international legal
community. For the most part, international law is still based on
a state-centric model. Yet, political and economic realities clearly
demonstrate that States are no longer the sole participants in the
world financial system. As the events which unfolded in Mexico
show, new entities possess and exercise elements of sovereignty.
However, recognition of this reallocation of powers, which occurs
in innumerable contexts on a daily basis, does not erase the
vitality of the State.
The "claim" elements of sovereignty remain constant:
Mexico's independence, personhood, identifiable government and
population were not directly challenged by the Peso Crisis.18
However, the Crisis did directly affect the "exercise" elements of
Mexico's sovereignty, most notably in the autonomy category.
The fact that portfolio managers directly rendered "advice" (which
by all implication was directive rather than educational) to
Mexican authorities responsible for setting economic and fiscal
policies, makes clear the conveyance of "exercise" elements. If
portfolio managers had made their voices heard in less overt ways,
some would have argued that Mexico ceded no autonomy but
participated of its own volition in a free market. The argument
would assume that money managers simply looked at competitive
conditions and chose the best alternative. This latter understand-
ing fits neatly within the state-centric model, with States remain-
ing as the dominant players and competing amongst themselves
for investment funds. Under this theory, portfolio investment
managers do not possess any "exercise" elements of sovereignty.
They enter the field after the elements have been exercised by the
State and only respond to existing conditions.
185 Although the long-range political future of the country remains
uncertain, this unrest is attributable to a number of factors, of which the Peso
Crisis is but one. Furthermore, a change in government does not mean that
there is no longer an identifiable government.
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As attractive as this scenario may be for those who favor the
state-centric model, it is premised on a distorted understanding of
political, economic and legal realities. The importance of
portfolio investment funds to States forces them to compete
fiercely for those funds. That competition takes place in a market
where terms are dictated by money managers. Even if the
competition is viewed as taking place between States, the rules of
the game are established by non-state actors. Thus, States do not
act freely in that they must convey the "exercise" element of
autonomy.
Why should we be concerned about this transfer of autonomy?
The passing of the "exercise" element of autonomy which occurs
when States participate in international investment markets
happens in many other situations as well. Typically, however, the
passage occurs through open and deliberate state action, involving
actors recognized as significant by the international community.
Thus, when a State elects to participate in certain trading regimes,
it surrenders some of its autonomy by making that choice.
Further, a State cedes to other States or state groupings
whatever "sticks" necessary to effectuate the arrangement. Even
where external factors, such as the customary international legal
prohibition of state-sponsored genocide, impose the reallocation
of "exercise" elements on a State, the passage occurs because other
States demand it. Thus, it falls within the traditional international
legal framework. Customary international law exists because a
sufficient number of States agree that it exists. This places
customary law firmly within a state-centric approach.
This model does not accommodate reallocations of "exercise"
elements of sovereignty to non-state, nontraditional international
actors such as money managers. Because money managers operate
outside the traditional state-centric model and because States feel
their influence in varying degrees,186 legal scholars, for the most
part, do not address them. However, economists and political
186 Economically secure countries, which are less reliant on portfolio
investment funds, may be less concerned about the increasing influence of
money managers, just as they appear to be less concerned about the impact of
increased globalization. See Roger Cohen, Global Forces Batter Politics, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1996, § 4 (Magazine), at 4 (stating that "[t]he difference
between America and Europe appears to lie in how threatening the changes
wrought by the global marketplace are perceived to be" and that in France a
psychosis over lost sovereignty is growing").
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scientists are starting to acknowledge the vast influence of money
managers. 
187
Does the lack of recognition from the legal community
matter? Would recognition lead to a "better" model? Would it
help prevent another Mexican Peso Crisis? The answers to these
questions are not clear. It may be impossible to prevent another
international economic crisis along the lines of the Peso Crisis, as
international financial affairs could be largely ungovernable.
Nevertheless, some proposals aimed at preventing such a recur-
rence are currently under consideration. A quick survey of these
proposals highlights the difficulties inherent in attempting to
regulate this area.
In the wake of the Mexican Peso Crisis, several proposals were
suggested to respond to future crises of a similar nature. These
include, among others, the creation of an emergency financing
mechanism or an international bankruptcy agency which would
require the international community to intervene when a country
faced severe financial problems similar to Mexico's. l"' This
would avoid the need for after-the-fact negotiation of aid. Other
proposals call for the creation of an international bondholder's
corporation to act as the equivalent of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation for bonds issued by developing countries.
A third suggestion is for an agreement between States to submit
investment disputes to courts in either the United States or Great
Britain, where sophisticated commercial laws exist."8 9
These efforts focus primarily on the implementation of
structures and the establishment of mechanisms utilizing estab-
lished international procedures. Each proposal depends on the
1s7 A pithy example on the domestic front comes from James Carville, who
states "[tie damned bond market... [w]ho the hell knew it was so powerful?
... If I'm ever reincarnated, I want to come back as the bond market. Then
everybody will be afraid of me and have to do what I say." Jerry Goodman,
Investing in a Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, S 6 (Magazine), at 28. See
also International Capital Markets Charting a Steadier Course, IMF SURVEY
(International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.), Sept. 23, 1996, at 297 (noting
that a study of international financial markets since the early 1990s "suggests
that these markets will continue to become more global and more dominated
by institutional investors") [hereinafter IMF SuRvEY].
... See generally James B. Hurlock, The Way Ahead for Sovereign Debt, INT'L
FIN. L. REv., July 1995, at 10, 12 (discussing responses to the problems of
sovereign liquidity and debt default, including the proposal that the IMF
become a global bankruptcy court).
1s9 See id.
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acquiescence of States, in keeping with a state-centric approach.
Additionally, each proposal aims primarily at minimizing the
fallout from market transactions and therefore creating some form
of a safety net. They focus on cleaning up the aftermath of a
crisis, rather than on prevention. Although they deserve careful
consideration, these proposals leave at least two important issues
unresolved. First, because each focuses on responses to negative
situations, none consider whether or how the situation could be
prevented from arising in the first instance. A better solution
would enable the international community to eliminate the
possibility of such crises in the first place. The JMF acknowledges
this problem, stating that in the endeavor to avoid future
problems "policy challenges remain ... whose resolution is
essential for the stable evolution of the international financial
system."1 90 Further, none of the "solutions" address the funda-
mental changes affecting the traditional model of international
law. Each attempts to use traditional international actors to
remedy problems caused by new actors, and each fails to explicitly
recognize the shifting power dynamics which contribute to the
initial problem.
7. CONCLUSION
Would it make a difference if money managers were recog-
nized as central international actors? Recognition alone will only
prevent money managers from exercising their power. Instead,
some type of control or regulation might be called for. Given the
realities of the marketplace, regulation of these actors may prove
very difficult. States depend in varying degrees on the funds
money managers provide, and many States will resist any
regulation which impedes the flow of those funds. States on
stronger financial footing may resist regulation on general policy
grounds.
The United States and other developed nations cannot decide
internally what level of regulation is appropriate for many
entities.19' It is unlikely that regulation on a global level would
190 RF SURVEY, supra note 187, at 293.
191 See IAN AYRES & JoHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992) ("The debate over:appropriate' levels of regulation 'has been rerun so many times that to open




be welcomed with open arms. Even if regulation were possible,
it would be difficult to enforce such rules in any meaningful
fashion. Attempts to enforce international regimes have proven
formidable. 92  There is no reason to believe that financial
regulations would fare any better.
While these and other problems with potential regulation of
money managers and other, similar types of international actors
cannot be ignored, they do not diminish the need to grant such
actors some recognition on the international stage. Recognition
and a reconfiguration of the state-centric model to include these
non-state actors would at least change the terms of the dialogue,
and might place issues regarding these entities squarely on the
international agenda. Consequently, the opportunity to use non-
regulatory approaches at modifying behavior, successfully
demonstrated by international experience with multinational
corporations, could arise. Although regulation of multinational
corporations also poses serious problems, over time and after their
power was recognized by many States, the attention multinational
corporations have received has led to a change in their behav-
ior.'93 The role of public opinion and attention should not be
ignored. Faced with extremely negative publicity about "sweat-
shop" working conditions, some American corporations voluntari-
ly altered their business practices. 94 Recognition of the role
that money managers play is the first step towards the possibility
immediately to sleep.'").
192 See generally GATT, supra note 35; NAFTA, supra note 35.
193 The power exercised by multinational corporations is widely recognized.
See Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and International Codes of
Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between International Legal Cooperation and
Economic Development, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1275 (1995) (discussing
various fears raised by transnational corporations and the prospects for a
United Nations code to regulate their conduct). Formal attempts to reulate
this power have proved unsuccessful to date, in large part because of the signifi-
cant effect such efforts will have on corporate-state relations and the unwilling-
ness of those on the state side of that equation to acknowledge and accommo-
date those changes. See, e.g., Commission on Transnational Corporations: Report
on the First Session, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/5655 (1975) (setting forth a code proposed by the U.N. Commission on
Transnational Corporations).
194 See Mark L. Clifford, Commentary: Keep the Heat on Sweatshops, Bus.
WK., Dec. 23, 1996, at 90 (discussing how U.S. corporations such as Nike
changed their practices after media reports of sweatshop labor brought the issue
to the attention of the public).
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of bringing similar pressures to bear.
Further, the reallocation of "exercise" elements of sovereignty
to money managers does in fact occur. Recognition of these
actors would encourage careful thinking about the role they play.
Although states and other entities may not be able to limit the
money managers' power of the purse, they could perhaps better
accommodate it in their policy decisions. Recognition may be
more important as a policy tool than as a control device, as a
means rather than an end. That aspect in no way diminishes its
importance. If we care about the end, we must take those steps
necessary to achieve it.
Therefore, in addition to crafting "solutions" to financial
crises, the international community will benefit if it openly
confronts the changes being wrought on the international stage.
There is no doubt that participants in the international communi-
ty are capable of reconfiguring the state-centric model. They may
partially overcome their reluctance to do so by realizing that this
recasting does not require elimination of the state-centric model
in its entirety nor minimize the importance of States. "Claim"
elements, those certain fixed attributes of state status, would
remain constant. Absent territory, personhood, population and
an identifiable government, an entity will not be recognized as a
State in the international community. The model must be
modified, however, to include an understanding that the "exercise"
elements traditionally associated with statehood are characteristics
which may be reallocated. Most importantly, the model must
accommodate new actors, reflecting the fact that "sticks" may be
passed to anyone. States or state-groupings are by no means the
only eligible recipients.
The once exclusive, inviolable nature of sovereignty has little
relevance in an interdependent, technologically connected world.
The difficulties that attempts to include non-state actors such as
money managers in a new model will encounter do not mean that
inclusion should be avoided. Instead, the herculean nature of the
task suggests that it should be undertaken immediately. States will
undoubtedly resist acknowledgment of non-States as capable of
exerting tremendous influence on state relations. However, this
influence is already strongly felt and cannot realistically be denied.
Recognition of the changing structure of the international
community calls for the development of a model of statehood and
sovereignty based on a property analogy. Such a model accommo-
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dates the divergent sovereign powers States may possess by
acknowledging that "exercise" elements of sovereignty may be
reallocated. A new model would break down the absolutist
definition of sovereignty into a workable concept for today's
realities.
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